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INTRODUCTION
During his eight years in office, President Barack Obama changed
the face of the federal judiciary. A total of 331 of his federal judicial
nominees were confirmed, a larger number (by one) than President
George W. Bush had confirmed during his eight year term.1 At the time
that Donald J. Trump became the President of the United States in
January of 2017, approximately two-thirds of federal district court
judges and approximately half of federal circuit judges had been
nominated by Democratic presidents.2 Several Obama nominees have
the promise to be major voices on the federal bench for decades to
come.3 President Obama successfully nominated two justices to the

Associate Professor of Law, George Washington University School of
Law. My thanks to the Wisconsin Law Review for their invitation to participate in this
symposium. A disclaimer: I participated in various capacities in many of these
nominations controversies, and have written about many of them for popular audiences.
One of the goals of this Essay is to provide some theoretical heft to tie together a lot of
what I have been doing for and writing about for larger audiences. For their comments
on this Essay, I would like to thank Michael Abramowicz, Thomas Colby, Aziz Huq,
Orin Kerr, and Peter Smith. For many discussions over the years on these issues,
special thanks to Micah Schwartzman.
1.
See
Judgeship
Appointments
by
President,
U.S.
CTS.,
http://www.uscourts.gov/sites/default/files/apptsbypres_0.pdf [https://perma.cc/5RNL6452] (last visited Mar. 12, 2017).
2.
Philip Rucker & Robert Barnes, Trump to Inherit More Than 100 Court
Vacancies, Plans to Reshape Judiciary, WASH. POST (Dec. 25, 2016),
https://www.washingtonpost.com/politics/trump-to-inherit-more-than-100-courtvacancies-plans-to-reshape-judiciary/2016/12/25/d190dd18-c928-11e6-85b576616a33048d_story.html?utm_term=.dce24dc0ebe5 [https://perma.cc/GG79-EEAK].
3.
See David Fontana, Obama Has Started Making Major Progress on
Nominating Judges—and This Is His Most Important One Yet, NEW REPUBLIC (May 13,
2014), https://newrepublic.com/article/117747/pamela-harris-fourth-circuit-court-whyliberals-should-cheer-her [https://perma.cc/E3E7-HNLP] (identifying Fourth Circuit
Judge Pamela Harris as an important nominee); David Fontana, Obama’s Shocking
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Supreme Court, both of whom (in different ways) have the potential to
contribute to the liberal jurisprudential cause for many years to come.4
President Obama’s federal judicial nominees were the most diverse
along many dimensions of any president in the history of the United
States.5 Some of these accomplishments were made possible by the
controversial decision by Senate Democrats in 2013 to abolish the
filibuster for lower court nominations.6
The perfect should not be the enemy of the good, but the good
enough should not distract progressives from what could have been
better for their judicial agenda. President Obama did a lot for the
federal courts, but could have done more. President Trump inherited
103 judicial vacancies from President Obama, almost twice the amount
President Obama inherited from President George W. Bush.7 Empirical
measures suggest that President Obama’s nominees were more
moderate, as compared to the more ideologically conservative nature of
the nominees of past Republican presidents.8 This was true even after
Success on Judicial Nominations Overturns Conventional Wisdom, DAILY BEAST (June
9, 2014, 4:45 AM), http://www.thedailybeast.com/articles/2014/06/09/obama-sshocking-success-on-judgeships-overturns-conventional-wisdom.html
[https://perma.cc/7C4Q-PC5G] (identifying First Circuit Judge David Barron, Ninth
Circuit Judge Michelle Friedland, and Southern District of New York Judges Jesse
Furman and Allison Nathan as future liberal judicial superstars).
4.
See David Fontana, The Obama Justices: Sonia Sotomayor and Elena
Kagan
Represent
Conflicting
Styles
of
Liberalism—Or
Are
They
Complementary?,
SLATE
(Jan.
13,
2015),
http://www.slate.com/articles/news_and_politics/jurisprudence/2015/01/obama_s_supre
me_court_justices_elena_kagan_and_sonia_sotomayor_have_elite.html
[https://perma.cc/X9U7-FV3E].
5.
See Donna Owens, Obama’s Legacy on Judicial Appointments, By the
Numbers,
NBC
NEWS
(Jan.
19,
2017,
9:21
PM),
http://www.nbcnews.com/storyline/president-obama-the-legacy/obama-s-legacyjudicial-appointments-numbers-n709306 [https://perma.cc/CD58-VWLX] (“The more
than 300 Obama-nominated judges are considered to be the most diverse group in
U.S. history in terms of terms of gender, ethnicity, and nationality.”).
6.
See Jeremy W. Peters, In Landmark Vote, Senate Limits
Use
of
the
Filibuster,
N.Y.
TIMES
(Nov.
21,
2013),
http://www.nytimes.com/2013/11/22/us/politics/reid-sets-in-motion-steps-to-limit-useof-filibuster.html [https://perma.cc/5WYL-SLK7].
7.
Rucker & Barnes, supra note 2.
8.
See Corey Rayburn Yung, Judged By The Company You Keep: An
Empirical Study of the Ideologies of Judges on the United States Courts of Appeals, 51
B.C. L. Rev. 1133, 1133 (2010) (“[I]n general judges appointed by Republican
presidents were more ideological than those appointed by Democratic presidents.”);
Neal Devins & Lawrence Baum, Split Definitive: How Party Polarization Turned the
Supreme Court Into A Partisan Court, 2016 SUP. CT. REV. (forthcoming 2017)
(manuscript at 6) (“Our analysis shows that the growing ideological gap between
Democratic-appointed justices and Republican-appointed justices is largely attributable
to the appointment of conservative Republican nominees.”).

Electronic copy available at: https://ssrn.com/abstract=2942297
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the elimination of the Senate filibuster constrained the Republican
Senators for two years (before they took back the Senate majority).9
Many of the superstars of the liberal legal movement often
identified as having transformative potential—Pamela Karlan or
Goodwin Liu, to name two—remain either not on the bench at all or
were appointed by Democratic Governors to state judicial positions.10
Consider, by contrast, that during the terms of the past three
Republican presidents, many of the most jurisprudentially influential
(and youngest) conservative lawyers had been successfully nominated to
the federal bench.11
This Essay argues that the tactical roots of these failures to do
more on judicial nominations during the Obama Administration reside
in a common tactical error made by political leaders in the Democratic
Party: excessive cooperation with political forces that do not manifest
the same behavioral patterns of cooperation.12 The Obama
9.
See Christina L. Boyd, Michael S. Lynch & Anthony J. Madonna,
Nuclear Fallout: Investigating the Effect of Senate Procedural Reform on Judicial
Nominations, 13 FORUM 623 (2015).
10.
See Howard Mintz, Goodwin Liu Confirmed to California Supreme
Court,
MERCURY
NEWS
(Aug.
31,
2011,
10:21
AM),
http://www.mercurynews.com/2011/08/31/goodwin-liu-confirmed-to-californiasupreme-court/ [https://perma.cc/Z4GJ-JDVG]; Jeffery Toobin, A Sharp Progressive
Joins
the
D.O.J.,
NEW
YORKER
(Dec.
20,
2013),
http://www.newyorker.com/news/news-desk/a-sharp-progressive-joins-the-d-o-j
[https://perma.cc/3G6M-5LDU].
11.
See David Fontana & Micah Schwartzman, Old World, NEW REPUBLIC
(July
17,
2009),
https://newrepublic.com/article/62573/old-world
[https://perma.cc/XEY4-PPAD] (“[R]oughly a quarter of the circuit-court nominees put
forward by the past three Republican presidents . . . were below the age of 45. Reagan
nominated some of the brightest young legal minds in the country, including Alex
Kozinski (then 34), Frank Easterbrook (36), Kenneth Starr (37), J. Harvie Wilkinson
(39), Doug Ginsburg (40), and Richard Posner (42). The first President Bush nominated
Michael Luttig (36), Samuel Alito (39), and Clarence Thomas (41). And George W.
Bush continued this practice, nominating Neil Gorsuch (38), Brett Kavanaugh (41),
Raymond Kethledge (41), Jeffrey Sutton (42), and William Pryor (42), among others.”).
12.
For a general discussion of the differing organizational purposes of the
two political parties, and the behavioral manifestations of these differences, see MATT
GROSSMANN & DAVID A. HOPKINS, ASYMMETRIC POLITICS: IDEOLOGICAL REPUBLICANS
AND GROUP INTEREST DEMOCRATS (2016); Jo Freeman, The Political Culture of the
Democratic and Republican Parties, 101 POL. SCI. Q. 327 (1986); Matt Grossmann &
David A. Hopkins, Ideological Republicans and Interest Group Democrats: The
Asymmetry of American Party Politics, 13 PERSP. ON POL. 119 (2015). See also Matt
Grossmann & David A. Hopkins, More Proof That Republicans Are From Mars and
Democrats
Are
From
Venus,
WASH.
POST
(Mar.
20,
2015),
https://www.washingtonpost.com/news/monkey-cage/wp/2015/03/10/more-proof-thatrepublicans-are-from-mars-and-democrats-are-from-venus/?utm_term=.a965c8ad357e
[https://perma.cc/P79Q-8JJ5] (summarizing this research by stating that “[t]he
Republican Party . . . is best understood as the agent of an ideological movement
dedicated to advancing the cause of conservatism. . . . The Democratic Party, in

Electronic copy available at: https://ssrn.com/abstract=2942297
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Administration did not avail itself of a supply side of uncooperative
tools used to approach judicial nominations, and focused mostly on
cooperative approaches to judicial nominations.
The Obama
Administration’s approach to judicial nominations, in other words,
featured asymmetric usage of “constitutional hardball”13 or
“constitutional showdowns.”14 In addition to the tactical argument, this
Essay has a taxonomical goal. Judicial nominations are a unique field of
political activity,15 in which a series of more aggressive political
strategies have emerged, yet have not previously been identified and
described. For both the tactical and the taxonomical, the goal is to take
a step back from the day-to-day politics of judicial nominations to make
some larger, more theoretical observations about the eight years of
judicial nominations by the Obama Administration that will shed some
light to inform later presidencies.
In game theoretic terms, the closest way to explain this would be
as follows. Engaging in a non-cooperative strategy with a cooperative
opponent yields a suboptimal result.16 There are not the political costs
contrast, is best understood as a coalition of social groups seeking various forms of
government action. Most Democratic supporters in the mass public are attracted to the
party for reasons of group interest or identity rather than a devotion to the principles of
liberalism.”). In the context of judicial nominations, see Lawrence Baum & Neal
Devins, Ideological Imbalance: Why Democrats Usually Pick Moderate-Liberal Justices
and Republicans Usually Pick Conservative Ones, SLATE (Mar. 17, 2016, 2:33 PM),
http://www.slate.com/articles/news_and_politics/jurisprudence/2016/03/democrats_alw
ays_pick_moderates_like_merrick_garland.html
[https://perma.cc/B77D-GXAU]
(“Democrats Bill Clinton and Barack Obama were careful to choose nominees who
stood on the liberal side of the ideological spectrum. But at the same time, they veered
away from candidates whose strong liberalism would prompt confirmation battles and
toward nominees who embraced the rhetoric of judicial restraint, had rich personal
histories, and were perceived as less ideological.”).
13.
Mark Tushnet, Constitutional Hardball, 37 J. MARSHALL L. REV. 523,
523 (2004) (defining constitutional hardball as “consist[ing] of political claims and
practices that are without much question within the bounds of existing constitutional
doctrine and practice but that are nonetheless in some tension with existing preconstitutional understandings”).
14.
Eric A. Posner & Adrian Vermeule, Constitutional Showdowns, 156 U.
PA. L. REV. 991, 997 (2008) (defining constitutional showdowns as featuring “a
disagreement between branches of government over their constitutional powers that
ends in the total or partial acquiescence by one branch in the views of the other and that
creates a constitutional precedent”).
15.
A sociologist would refer to judicial nominations as a “field.” See Neil
Fligstein, The Theory of Fields and Its Application to Corporate Governance, 39
SEATTLE U. L. REV. 237, 242 (2016) (featuring a description by a leading sociologist of
a field as a “socially constructed arena[] within which individuals or groups with
differing resource endowments vie for advantage”) (citations omitted).
16.
See Louis Kaplow, On the Meaning of Horizontal Agreements in
Competition Law, 99 CALIF. L. REV. 683, 781–82 (2011) (summarizing the difference
between cooperative and non-cooperative games as being that “all noncooperative
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for being aggressive that existed before our age of polarization, and
indeed there are political benefits to being aggressive. Because the
violation of cooperative norms generates a greater backlash by
opponents and supporters alike—without the political resources
necessary to overcome those greater political costs—non-cooperative
strategies fail in a largely cooperative environment for three related
reasons.17 In the context of judicial nominations, the assumption was
that Republican Senators and affiliated interest groups were not engaged
in “empire-building government.”18 A more aggressive strategy by the
Obama Administration would therefore have generated additional
political costs by antagonizing the opposition.19 Second, these direct
political costs generate additional opportunity costs.20 Political
resources spent overcoming Senate obstruction—both public and
private21—are political resources not spent on ensuring the enactment of
the Patient Protection and Affordable Care Act to provide health care
games . . . must be described as involving no agreement. . . . [I]f there is an
agreement, we by definition have a cooperative game, but it was stipulated that the
game is noncooperative”).
17.
See David Fontana & Donald Braman, Judicial Backlash or Just
Backlash? Evidence From A National Experiment, 112 COLUM. L. REV. 731, 766
(2012) (identifying the arguments behind cooperative strategies).
18.
Daryl J. Levinson, Empire-Building Government in Constitutional Law,
118 HARV. L. REV. 915, 916 (2005) (“A[n] . . . enduring and pervasive assumption in
constitutional law and theory is that much government behavior is driven by empirebuilding, the self-aggrandizing pursuit of power or wealth.”).
19.
See, e.g., Neil A. Lewis, Moderate Is Said To Be Pick for Court,
N.Y.
TIMES
(Mar.
17,
2009),
http://www.nytimes.com/2009/03/17/us/politics/17nominate.html
[https://perma.cc/S67Z-WDEL] (“The administration official said part of the reason for
making the [David] Hamilton nomination [to the Seventh Circuit] the administration’s
first public entry into the often contentious field of judicial selection was to serve ‘as a
kind of signal’ about the kind of nominees Mr. Obama will select. The official spoke on
the condition of anonymity because the nomination had not been officially made.”);
Jeffrey
Toobin,
Bench
Press,
NEW
YORKER
(Sept.
21,
2009),
http://www.newyorker.com/magazine/2009/09/21/bench-press
[https://perma.cc/RZ7Z-258J] (“The hope was that Hamilton’s appointment would
begin a profound and rapid change in the confirmation process and in the federal
judiciary itself.”).
20.
See Michael Grunwald, Did Obama Win the Judicial Wars?, POLITICO
(Aug. 8, 2016, 5:25 AM), http://www.politico.com/story/2016/08/obama-courtsjudicial-legacy-226741 [https://perma.cc/YE7E-BN2J] (noting that “Obama’s first chief
of staff, Rahm Emanuel, made it clear internally that he didn’t want to waste precious
political capital on polarizing judges”).
21.
See Catherine Fisk & Erwin Chemerinsky, The Filibuster, 49 STAN. L.
REV. 181, 206 (1997) (“In most cases, the two-track system keeps filibusters out of the
public eye.”); id. at 181 (“Filibusters are ubiquitous but virtually invisible, for the
contemporary Senate practice does not require a senator to hold the floor to filibuster;
senators filibuster simply by indicating to the Senate leadership that they intend to do
so.”).
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or a stimulus package to protect the economy. Third, the assumption is
that there is not the same political energy and therefore not the same
political resources within the Democratic Party on judicial nominations
to overcome political costs as there is in the Republican Party.22
Aggressive strategies generate new political enemies and no new—but
much needed—political friends.
However, judicial nominations have increasingly become a noncooperative environment in which non-cooperative strategies fare
better. Now that both political parties are increasingly polarized, the
incentives to cooperate with the other political party are much lower.23
The result is that more and more fields of political action are dominated
by political parties that do not respect traditional written and unwritten
norms of cooperation. In this environment, non-cooperative strategies
perform increasingly better. More aggressive strategies to accomplish
more transformative outcomes generate the same political costs in terms
of opposition as do less aggressive strategies. More aggressive
strategies generate more political resources in terms of active and
engaged support from political allies.
The tactical argument for the possibilities generated by more
aggressive approaches to judicial nominations is made in the context of
a series of identifiable practices towards judicial nominations that have
emerged in past presidential administrations, yet were relatively
underutilized during the Obama Administration. These tactical tools are
helpful whether the task is nominating a district court judge, a circuit
court judge, or a Supreme Court Justice, and are helpful when
controlling the Senate or facing a Senate controlled by the opposition
party.
I label these three tactical tools—visible outside of the nominations
context as well—as naming, numbing, and numbers. Naming means an
Administration selecting nominees that identify their jurisprudential
perspective with a particular frame—such as originalism—and
promoting these nominees by also using that name. Numbing means the
open consideration and/or selection of unusually provocative judicial
nominees that generate political extremeness aversion. The political
22.
See Richard A. Posner, Justice Breyer Throws Down the Gauntlet, 115
YALE L.J. 1699, 1699 (2006) (“In recent years, the initiative in constitutional debate
has passed to the conservatives . . . . The liberals continue to win a significant share of
victories, in such areas as homosexual rights, affirmative action, and capital
punishment, but for the most part their stance, their outlook, has been defensive:
defense of the Warren Court and Roe v. Wade.”).
23.
See Daryl J. Levinson & Richard H. Pildes, Separation of Parties, Not
Powers, 119 HARV. L. REV. 2311, 2332 (2006) (“[T]he two major parties today are as
coherent and polarized as they have been in perhaps a century, and for reasons that are
likely to endure.”).
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system is distracted from other nominees by the controversial political
or actual nominee, and other nominees are framed as less controversial
because their views are distorted by comparison to the controversial
potential or actual nominees. Numbers refers to the simultaneous
nomination of a large number of judges to the federal bench. The
volume of nominees precludes the opposition from being able to direct
resources towards a critical mass of nominees, and also generates
political pressure to confirm a critical mass so as to avoid being labeled
as obstructing the Senate.
Two caveats are worth making. First, it could be that the Obama
Administration’s record on judicial nominations was a purposefully lost
opportunity, in that the nature and number of its nominees reflected
genuinely revealed preferences of the President leading the efforts of
the Administration. President Obama himself wrote before becoming
President24—and indicated when he was President25—that he was quite
content with a more limited role for the federal courts and therefore a
more limited focus on judicial nominations. Scholars affiliated with the
political left had spent at least a decade before President Obama took
office in 2009 exploring the theoretical merits of “taking the
Constitution away from the courts”26 and focusing increasingly on
popular constitutionalism.27 The Obama Administration, though,
featured its share of cause lawyers inside the Administration and liberal
groups outside of the Administration advocating for efforts to shape the
federal bench.28 Later Democratic Administrations surely will feature
those constituencies as well. This Essay is meant to provide a tactical
roadmap to frame their approach.
24.
See BARACK OBAMA, THE AUDACITY OF HOPE: THOUGHTS ON
RECLAIMING THE AMERICAN DREAM 83 (2006) (“[I]n our reliance on the courts to
vindicate not only our rights but also our values, progressives had lost too much faith in
democracy.”).
25.
See Jeffrey Toobin, The Obama Brief: The President Considers His
Judicial Legacy, NEW YORKER (Oct. 27, 2014),
http://www.newyorker.com/magazine/2014/10/27/obama-brief
[https://perma.cc/R4NG-YREY] (quoting Obama as stating that “[t]he bulk of my
nominees, twenty years ago or even ten years ago, would have been considered very
much centrists, well within the mainstream of American jurisprudence, not particularly
fire-breathing or ideologically driven”).
26.
See MARK TUSHNET, TAKING THE CONSTITUTION AWAY FROM THE
COURTS (1999).
27.
See Robert Post & Reva Siegel, Popular Constitutionalism,
Departmentalism, and Judicial Supremacy, 92 CALIF. L. REV. 1027, 1043 (2004) (“The
danger of judicial supremacy is not that the people will be deprived of the authority to
decide a particular case, but rather that they will cease to maintain a vibrant and
energetic engagement with the process of constitutional self-governance.”).
28.
See Margo Schlanger, Offices of Goodness: Influence Without Authority
in Federal Agencies, 36 CARDOZO L. REV. 53, 115 (2014).
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Second, this Essay is about the boundaries of the possible, not the
desirability of the possible. The goal is to identify the possibilities for
Democratic Presidents wishing to prioritize judicial nominations, and
the tactical approaches to achieve these possibilities that are often
neglected in scholarly and public discussions. Identifying more
aggressive strategies that could have worked is not the same as saying
these strategies should be utilized all things considered. A complete
normative evaluation of uncooperative approaches to judicial
nominations would have to consider, for instance, whether
uncooperative behavior is justified as a tactical response to initially
uncooperative behavior, or whether the damage to our institutional
norms generated by any uncooperative behavior is too great.29
I. NAMING
Judicial nominations are a unique occasion to define and promote
the jurisprudential vision that a presidential administration desires—to
name that vision. The large stakes involved in judicial nominations
means that nominations serve as a focal point to coordinate legal
activities and construct a name for the associated jurisprudential vision.
The microphone provided by the stakes of judicial nominations provides
an occasion to promote that name and the associated jurisprudential
vision. Naming does not generate any additional opposition to nominees
in the Senate, because senators will often pin names on nominees not
deserving of such labels. Naming does, though, mobilize political
resources behind a judicial nominee and the President promoting that
nominee.
The act of naming the jurisprudential vision that a presidential
administration wishes to promote is a crucial part of promoting the
success of that jurisprudential vision. Scholars in the social sciences
have often referred to this act of naming as constructing a “frame,” or
a “schemata of interpretation” that encourages people to “locate,
perceive, identify and label” experiences and events into a coherent
whole.30 Framing a jurisprudential vision in terms of a singular name
“provide[s] a grammar that punctuates and syntactically connects

29.
The larger theoretical issue this raises was framed by David Pozen’s
important article. See David E. Pozen, Self-Help and the Separation of Powers, 124
YALE L.J. 2, 5 (2014) (considering “when . . . officials in one branch of the federal
government [can] attempt to redress another branch's perceived wrong through means
that, but for that wrongdoing, would be impermissible”).
30.
ERVING GOFFMAN, FRAME ANALYSIS: AN ESSAY ON THE ORGANIZATION
OF EXPERIENCE 21 (1974).
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patterns or happenings in the world.”31 This name will provide a
diagnosis (what past wrong the new vision is trying to remedy), a
prognosis (identifying the tools that will be used to implement that
remedy), and a motivation (suggesting why the stakes of this remedy
are so important).32
Naming plays several constructive roles for a presidential
administration. Administrations rely on tools like the Office of
Information and Regulatory Affairs (OIRA) to coordinate executive
actions.33 Naming plays a similar function as an OIRA directive: it
minimizes agency costs within a presidential administration by
suggesting to disparate officials within the administration what the legal
ambitions of the administration are. The lawyer in the White House
evaluating nominees to the federal courts and the lawyer arguing a case
from the Civil Appellate Division of the Department of Justice both
know they are bound by the jurisprudential vision reflected in that
name.34 Names can feature ambiguities, to be sure, but administrations
can engage in efforts to remove those ambiguities and ensure a more
faithful implementation of the jurisprudential vision. The most dramatic
illustration of this was promulgation by the Office of Legal Policy in
the Department of Justice during the Reagan Administration of the
Guidelines on Constitutional Litigation and The Constitution in the Year
2000: Choices Ahead in Constitutional Interpretation, both of which
provided more granular guidance to the executive branch about
constitutional choices.35
Naming tries to persuade members of the public of the merits of
the jurisprudential vision of the presidential administration.36 Members
31.
See David A. Snow & Robert D. Benford, Master Frames and Cycles of
Protest, in FRONTIERS IN SOCIAL MOVEMENT THEORY 133, 138 (Aldon D. Morris &
Carol McClurg Mueller eds., 1992).
32.
Robert D. Benford & David A. Snow, Framing Processes and Social
Movements: An Overview and Assessment, 26 ANN. REV. SOC. 611, 615 (2000).
33.
See Elena Kagan, Presidential Administration, 114 HARV. L. REV. 2245,
2277–90 (2001).
34.
See Steven M. Teles, Transformative Bureaucracy: Reagan’s Lawyers
and the Dynamics of Political Investment, 23 STUD. AM. POL. DEV. 61, 66 (2009)
(noting how the Reagan Administration used the originalism vision to coordinate
personnel selection and action across the government).
35.
For a discussion of the nature and significance of these documents, see
Dawn E. Johnsen, Ronald Reagan and the Rehnquist Court on Congressional Power:
Presidential Influences on Constitutional Change, 78 IND. L.J. 363 (2003); Reva B.
Siegel, Dead or Alive: Originalism as Popular Constitutionalism in Heller, 122 HARV.
L. REV. 191, 221–23 (2008).
36.
See Jamal Greene, Selling Originalism, 97 GEO. L.J. 657, 703 (2009)
(noting how the ultimate goal of these names is to generate “prestige and . . . corral
and preserve the majorities necessary to distribute her constitutional ideas”); Dan M.
Kahan, The Supreme Court 2010 Term: Foreword: Neutral Principles, Motivated
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of the public do not have the interest or the aptitude to engage in
sophisticated analysis of complicated jurisprudential debates, so the
name attached to a position can be important.37 The name constructs
what arguments are considered “on the wall” and “off the wall.”38 The
mere fact that those in power are using this name and grouping
arguments together with that name moves the jurisprudential debate in
the direction of that name by dominating the public debate about legal
issues.39
Scholars such as Reva Siegel and Steven Teles have, for instance,
identified the role that originalism plays as a name both to identify the
problems with the Warren Court and to promote the alternative
approach to judging that Republican presidents have supported.40
Conservatives organized around originalism as the name for what the
Warren Court lacked and what a new Reagan or Bush-dominated lower
court judge or Supreme Court Justice would utilize.41 Justice Antonin
Scalia argued that “it takes a theory to beat a theory,”42 and indeed
liberals have debated and designed their own alternative names for what

Cognition and Some Problems for Constitutional Law, 125 HARV. L. REV. 1, 74 (2011)
(noting how these names serve as “signals that are received by intermediary groups —
including politicians and media commentators — who then amplify and retransmit them
to members of the cultural groups who look to them for guidance”).
37.
See Greene, supra note 36, at 710 (“So too the language of originalism,
and particularly its appeal to scientific norms, satisfies a public demand for a digestible
means of muting conflict over unresolved issues of constitutional law.”) (citations
omitted).
38.
See Jack M. Balkin, How Social Movements Change (or Fail to Change)
the Constitution: The Case of the New Departure, 39 SUFFOLK U. L. REV. 27, 30, 52
(2005).
39.
See Teles, supra note 34, at 78 (noting the “capacity of senior
government officials . . . to move otherwise marginal ideas into the intellectual
mainstream”).
40.
See Siegel, supra note 35, at 192–93 (“Heller’s originalism enforces
understandings . . . that were forged in the late twentieth century through
[conservative] popular constitutionalism. . . . Heller respects claims and compromises
forged in social movement conflict . . . in the decades after Brown v. Board of
Education.”) (citations omitted).
41.
See JOHNATHAN O’NEILL, ORIGINALISM IN AMERICAN LAW AND POLITICS:
A CONSTITUTIONAL HISTORY 111–32, 162–70 (2005); STEVEN M. TELES, THE RISE OF
THE CONSERVATIVE LEGAL MOVEMENT: THE BATTLE FOR CONTROL OF THE LAW 145
(2008); Al Kamen & Howard Kurtz, Theorists on Right Find Fertile Ground:
Conservative Legal Activists Exert Influence on Justice Department, WASH. POST, Aug.
9, 1985, at A1.
42.
See Antonin Scalia, Originalism: The Lesser Evil, 57 U. CIN. L. REV.
849, 854 (1989) (“[I]t is hard to discern any emerging consensus among the
nonoriginalists as to what this might be.”).
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their judges and Justices would use as their guiding interpretive
philosophy.43
Judicial nominations play an important role in the construction and
promotion of the name that the presidential administration wishes to
promote. Nominations serve as a “focal point” permitting those inside
and outside of an administration to coordinate themselves.44 Because of
the stakes of judicial nominations, disparate interests will sit down
across the table to debate and discuss their constitutional visions. These
conversations can generate conflict about a name, but also move these
interests closer towards a consensus about what that name should be.
Stakeholders convened together recognize that without a name, their
shared and separate interests will suffer. Indeed, this is a version of
what happened during the Reagan Administration.45 Theorists outside of
the government, lawyers inside of the government, and activists in
between worked together to identify and agree on the originalism name
as an initial frame.46 The converse of this is true, too: if an
administration does not focus on generating a name, no focal point will
be constructed, no multi-interest conversations will ensue, and no
movement towards a naming consensus will result.
Once agreed upon, this name also serves as a pre-commitment
devise shaping other nominations.47 It is easier to monitor the president
selecting nominees, the Senate evaluating nominees, and the interest
groups promoting or opposing nominees once their shared
jurisprudential commitment has a name. Consider, for instance, the
reaction of conservative interest groups once President George W. Bush
nominated Harriet Miers and these interest groups learned she was not
using the name or arguments associated with their originalist
preferences.48
43.

For an example of a book providing such names, see THE CONSTITUTION
M. Balkin & Reva B. Siegel eds., 2009).
44.
See Richard H. McAdams, The Focal Point Theory of Expressive Law, in
7 ENCYCLOPEDIA OF LAW AND ECONOMICS 167, 167 (Francesco Parisi ed., 2d ed. 2011)
(describing a focal point as “mak[ing] mutually salient a particular way of coordinating
behavior”).
45.
See Teles, supra note 34.
46.
Id.
47.
See Jon Elster, Don’t Burn Your Bridge Before You Come To It: Some
Ambiguities and Complexities of Precommitment, 81 TEX. L. REV. 1751, 1754 (2003)
(“When precommitting himself, a person acts at one point in time in order to ensure
that at some later time he will perform an act that he could but would not have
performed without that prior act. As I define it, precommitment requires an observable
action, not merely a mental resolution.”)
48.
See Jonathan Riehl, Dissertation, The Federalist Society and Movement
Conservatism: How a Fractious Coalition on the Right is Changing Constitutional Law
and the Way We Talk and Think About It 1–5 (U. N.C.–Chapel Hill, 2007),
IN 2020 (Jack
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Judicial nominations also play an important role in promoting the
jurisprudential vision. For lower court nominations, the nomination by
a president of a candidate affiliated with that name and the affiliated
jurisprudential vision signals to the legal community that the president
is serious about promoting that vision. Advocates making their case to
the administration on policy and legal matters will know of the
jurisprudential philosophy that the administration support.49 Lawyers
arguing before judges appointed by the administration will know what
types of arguments that judge is more likely to find convincing.50
Ambitious lawyers desiring a judicial or other nomination by the
administration will know that familiarity with and usage of that name
will help their chances.51
For Supreme Court nominations, naming plays this promotional
role in the eyes of the public as well.52 Critical interest groups aspire to
hold senators and presidents accountable for their nominations behavior
and their consistency with particular jurisprudential commitments.53
With the exception of the rare Supreme Court decision that generates
broad public debate—such as Roe v. Wade54 or Citizens United v.
https://cdr.lib.unc.edu/indexablecontent/uuid:a046e8b1-4e0b-4af8-8a08-cea9e5cb58a7
[https://perma.cc/ZSU9-WUWZ].
49.
See Teles, supra note 34, at 66 (noting how originalism was an
argumentative style used to persuade the Reagan Department of Justice of many
initiatives).
50.
See Nancy Scherer & Banks Miller, The Federalist Society’s Influence on
the Federal Judiciary, 62 POL. RES. Q. 366 (2009) (finding that judges involved in the
Federalist Society found certain types of arguments more convincing and deployed
these arguments more frequently).
51.
See David Kirkpatrick, ’85 Document Opens Window to Alito Views,
N.Y.
TIMES
(Nov.
15,
2005),
http://www.nytimes.com/2005/11/15/politics/politicsspecial1/85-document-openswindow-to-alito-views.html [https://perma.cc/RDY6-55NP] (describing Samuel Alito’s
application to the Justice Department and its discussion of these conservative legal
touchstones).
52.
See Amy Goldstein & Paul Kane, Liberalism Had Little Presence in
Sotomayor
Hearings,
WASH.
POST
(July
19,
2009),
http://www.washingtonpost.com/wpdyn/content/article/2009/07/18/AR2009071801787.html
[https://perma.cc/SC4R6MDC] (quoting critics of the Sotomayor confirmation hearings, including former
University of Chicago Law School Dean saying that the confirmation hearings “did
serious damage to the cause of progressive thought in constitutional law” and
progressive activist Doug Kendall saying that it was “a totally missed opportunity. . . .
The progressive legal project hit rock bottom [last] week”).
53.
For empirical evidence that they do, see Gregory A. Caldeira & John R.
Wright, Lobbying for Justice: Organized Interests Supreme Court Nominations, and
United States Senate, 42 AM. J. POL. SCI. 499 (1998); Jeffrey A. Segal et al., A Spatial
Model of Roll Call Voting: Senators, Constituents, Presidents, and Interest Groups in
Supreme Court Confirmations, 36 AM. J. POL. SCI. 96 (1992).
54.
410 U.S. 113 (1973).
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F.E.C.55—the public is paying far greater attention to the judicial
system during a Supreme Court nomination than at any other moment.56
The public does not pay great attention to the nuances of legal
arguments, and so these confirmation hearings and the debates
surrounding them generate a sense of what legal arguments are
plausible and desirable. This sense is furthered if these arguments are
framed together with a unifying name.57 The Senate confirmation
hearing surrounding the nomination of Robert Bork to the Supreme
Court, for instance, was seen as a public demonstration of the
“intellectual seriousness” and salience of originalism.58 Chief Justice
John Roberts described his role as that of an “umpire,”59 using a name
that stimulated major public attention.60 Justice Sonia Sotomayor’s
remark earlier in her career that being a “wise Latina”61 could shape
her jurisprudence likewise became a name that pervaded public
discussion about her nomination.
Republican presidents have tended more openly to locate and
promote judges who embrace the name originalism.62 Republican
55.
56.

558 U.S. 310 (2010).
See generally JAMES L. GIBSON & GREGORY A. CALDEIRA, CITIZENS,
COURTS AND CONFIRMATIONS: POSITIVITY THEORY AND THE JUDGMENTS OF THE
AMERICAN PEOPLE 8, 11 (2009).
57.
See Amy Kapczynski, The Access to Knowledge Mobilization and the
New Politics of Intellectual Property, 117 YALE L.J. 804, 813 (2008) (“Framing theory
emerged out of the recognition that one cannot organize in concert with others to alter a
set of material conditions without an interpretation of one's interests or grievances and
theories of how to advance them.”).
58.
See Matthew J. Franck, The Originalist’s Originalist, NAT’L REV. (Jan.
28, 2013), https://www.nationalreview.com/nrd/articles/337354/original-originalist
[https://perma.cc/S3MD-WHRP].
59.
Confirmation Hearing on the Nomination of John G. Roberts, Jr. to be
Chief Justice of the United States Before the S. Comm. on the Judiciary, 109th Cong.
55 (2005) (statement of Judge John G. Roberts, Jr.) (“Judges are
like umpires. Umpires don’t make the rules, they apply them. The role of
an umpire and a judge is critical. They make sure everybody plays by the rules, but it is
a limited role. Nobody ever went to a ball game to see an umpire.”).
60.
See Bruce Weber, Umpires vs. Judges, N.Y. TIMES (July 11, 2009),
http://www.nytimes.com/2009/07/12/weekinreview/12weber.html
[https://perma.cc/NVM5-H6WY] (“But since the Roberts hearings, the umpire
metaphor has become synonymous, at least in public debate, with judicial restraint, the
idea that judges are merely arbiters, that their job is not to set aside precedent and
create law but to decide cases on the basis of established law.”).
61.
Sonia Sotomayor, A Latina Judge’s Voice, 13 BERKELEY LA RAZA L.J.
87, 92 (2002) (“I would hope that a wise Latina woman with the richness of her
experiences would more often than not reach a better conclusion than a white male who
hasn't lived that life.”).
62.
See Dawn Johnsen, Lessons from the Right: Progressive Constitutionalism
for the Twenty-First Century, 1 HARV. L. & POL’Y REV. 239, 246 (2007) (“Although
the practice of considering prospective judges’ views is far from a recent development,
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presidents have indicated that they have a name for what they want
from a judge or justice, and do not hide from that name.63 Individuals
most prominently affiliated with generating that name are themselves
nominated. Bork remains the most notable example of this. Bork was
one of the theorists behind the creation of modern originalism.64
President Ronald Reagan nominated him to the Supreme Court, and he
and his supporters referenced Bork’s support of this name and vision of
originalism as part of the reason to support his nomination.65 During his
confirmation hearings, Bork embraced originalism rather than avoiding
it.66
The lesson supposedly learned from Bork’s defeat was to hide
legal views during hearings.67 Conservative nominees have therefore
used the o-word less often explicitly, but still some of the time, and
even when not using it directly have made arguments about judging that
are part of the originalist project.
During the second Bush Administration, nominees to the lower
federal courts reflected and reinforced these naming efforts. Law
professor Michael McConnell was one of the most influential originalist

the Reagan/Meese reports stand out as unprecedented in their combination of great
specificity, comprehensiveness, and sheer ambition.”).
63.
See Neil A. Lewis & David Johnston, Bush Would Sever Law Group’s
Role
in
Screening
Judges,
N.Y.
TIMES
(Mar.
17,
2001),
http://www.nytimes.com/2001/03/17/us/bush-would-sever-law-group-s-role-inscreening-judges.html [https://perma.cc/E6AF-VX5F] (compiling statements by
candidate and then President George W. Bush indicating his desire for “originalist”
Justices like Antonin Scalia and Clarence Thomas).
64.
See Thomas B. Colby & Peter J. Smith, Living Originalism, 59 DUKE
L.J. 239, 248 (2009) (“[S]cholars like Raoul Berger and Robert Bork, and political and
judicial figures like Attorney General Edwin Meese III and then-Justice Rehnquist
began to compose scholarly monographs articulating an intellectual defense of
originalism in the 1970s and 1980s.”).
65.
See generally ETHAN BRONNER, BATTLE FOR JUSTICE: HOW THE BORK
NOMINATION SHOOK AMERICA (2007) (compiling statements of Bork supporters
referencing him during his nomination as an originalist).
66.
See Linda Greenhouse, The Bork Hearings: Bork’s Testimony Ends with
Panel
Still
Deeply
Split,
N.Y.
TIMES
(Sept.
20,
1987),
http://www.nytimes.com/1987/09/20/us/the-bork-hearings-bork-s-testimony-ends-withpanel-still-deeply-split.html?pagewanted=all [https://perma.cc/QNS7-UEEV] (“For
more than an hour, Senator Arlen Specter, Republican of Pennsylvania, engaged Judge
Bork in a dialogue that ranged over many constitutional issues but focused on one that
lies at the heart of the debate over Judge Bork’s confirmation: the nominee’s insistence
that the original intent of the framers is the only valid guide in interpreting the
Constitution.”).
67.
See, e.g., Elena Kagan, Confirmation Messes, Old and New, 62 U. CHI.
L. REV. 919, 920 (1995) (reviewing STEPHEN L. CARTER, THE CONFIRMATION MESS
(1994)) (noting the incentives after the Bork defeat for the Senate to “cease[] . . .
engag[ing] nominees in meaningful discussion of legal issues”).
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constitutional theorists in the academy at the time.68 During his
confirmation hearing to be a judge on the United States Court of
Appeals for the Tenth Circuit, he largely embraced his earlier views,
even attacking Griswold v. Connecticut69 and Roe v. Wade by name.70
McConnell provided an originalist defense of the invalidity of laws
criminalizing polygamy.71 When Janice Rogers Brown was nominated
to the United States Court of Appeals for the District of Columbia
Circuit, she likewise rejected Griswold as unmoored in originalist
constitutional understandings.72 When Brett Kavanaugh—a former clerk
to Bork—was nominated to the D.C. Circuit, he rejected any sense that
the Constitution was living.73
However, naming has been perceived as tactically problematic for
the Democratic Party because it is uncooperative. The language of
technical competence dominates public discourse about judicial
nominations.74 Presidents, senators, and interest groups focus on the
qualifications of nominees. Discussion of litmus tests related to a
jurisprudential name are disavowed by those on both sides of the
political aisle.75 When President Barack Obama introduced Elena Kagan
68.
See, e.g., Michael W. McConnell, Originalism and the Desegregation
Decisions, 81 VA. L. REV. 947, 955 (1995) (arguing that “[a]n originalist approach in
Brown would have paved the way for a more powerful judicial assault on the Jim Crow
laws of the South”). See also David G. Savage, Liberals at Odds
Over
Appeals
Court
Nominee,
L.A.
TIMES
(Sept.
16,
2002),
http://articles.latimes.com/2002/sep/16/nation/na-mcconnell16
[https://perma.cc/CQ4T-SB9N] (“Yale law professor Akhil D. Amar, a liberal
constitutional scholar, calls McConnell ‘America’s preeminent scholar of religious
liberty.’ The University of Chicago’s Cass R. Sunstein, a liberal constitutional theorist,
calls him ‘extraordinarily able, one of the best constitutional scholars in the country.’”).
69.
381 U.S. 479 (1965).
70.
Confirmation Hearing on the Nomination of Michael McConnell To Be
Circuit Judge For The Tenth Circuit, Before the S. Comm. on the Judiciary, 107th
Cong. 350, 383 (2002).
71.
Id. at 354, 377–79.
72.
Confirmation Hearing on the Nomination of Janice R. Brown, Of
California, To Be Circuit Judge For The District of Columbia Circuit, Before the S.
Comm. on the Judiciary, 108th Cong. 62 (2003).
73.
Confirmation Hearing on the Nomination of Brett Kavanaugh To Be
Circuit Judge For The District of Columbia Circuit, Before the S. Comm. on the
Judiciary, 109th Cong. 45 (2006).
74.
See GIBSON & CALDEIRA, supra note 56, at 11 (noting the salience of the
argument “that the nominee ought to be judged primarily (if not exclusively) on
legalistic criteria like judiciousness”).
75.
See Peter Baker, Obama Promises No ‘Litmus Test’ for Supreme Court
Nominee,
N.Y.
TIMES
(Apr.
21,
2010,
11:38
AM),
https://thecaucus.blogs.nytimes.com/2010/04/21/obama-promises-no-litmus-test-forsupreme-court-nominee/ [https://perma.cc/X99V-TQBF] (“President Obama said on
Wednesday that he has no abortion litmus test as he selects a replacement for Justice
John Paul Stevens.”).
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as his Supreme Court nominee, he mentioned that she was “one of the
nation’s foremost legal minds,” and he mentioned several times during
the Senate’s consideration of her that she clerked for the Supreme
Court.76 Names are supposed to signal partiality rather than the
objectivity that presidents and senators are supposed to desire from
their judicial nominees. With better filtration mechanisms, we all know
that judges nominated by Democratic presidents tend to be more liberal
than those nominated by Republican presidents,77 but to admit this and
desire this openly can be an uncooperative political act.
Democrats working on judicial nominations have argued that
naming is therefore counterproductive because of the excessive cost
generated by it. A judicial nominee who uses the name affiliated with a
governing judicial philosophy—such as using the phrase “living
constitutionalism”—places a bullseye on his or her back. Interest
groups pull the “fire alarm”78 and notify relevant senators of the
problematic nominee.79 Senators from the party of the president elected
from swing states will be less inclined to support the nominee.80
Senators from the opposing party are more likely to use the many

76.
See Remarks by the President and Elena Kagan at Reception Honoring
Her Confirmation (Aug. 6, 2010), https://obamawhitehouse.archives.gov/the-pressoffice/2010/08/06/remarks-president-and-elena-kagan-reception-honoring-herconfirmation [https://perma.cc/8P2Q-RSWV]; see also Peter Baker & Jeff Zeleny,
Obama Picks Kagan, Scholar but Not Judge, for Court Seat, N.Y. TIMES (May 10,
2010), http://www.nytimes.com/2010/05/11/us/politics/11court.html?pagewanted=all
[https://perma.cc/U4CF-2Y2F].
77.
See Lawrence Baum & Neal Devins, Split Definitive: For the First Time
in a Century, the Supreme Court is Divided Solely by Political Party,
SLATE
(Nov.
11,
2011,
5:27
PM),
http://www.slate.com/articles/news_and_politics/jurisprudence/2011/11/supreme_court
_s_partisan_divide_and_obama_s_health_care_law.html
[https://perma.cc/LCQ4SU8D] (“For the first time in a century, the Supreme Court is divided solely by
political party.”).
78.
Nancy Scherer, Brandon L. Bartels & Amy Steigerwalt, Sounding the
Fire Alarm: The Role of Interest Groups in the Lower Federal Court Confirmation
Process, 70 J. POL. 1026, 1029 (2008).
79.
See Nancy Scherer, Brandon L. Bartels & Amy Steigerwalt, Sounding the
Fire Alarm: The Role of Interest Groups in the Lower Federal Court Confirmation
Process (unpublished manuscript) (“[W]e theorize that a principal function of interest
groups in the lower court confirmation process is to act as ‘fire marshals’ for the
Senate. By alerting the Senate to problematic nominees, interest groups aid the Senate
in its constitutional mission under Article II to provide ‘advice and consent’ to the
president on all life-tenured federal court nominations.”).
80.
See Jonathan P. Kastellec et al., Public Opinion and Senate Confirmation
of Supreme Court Nominees, 72 J. POL. 767, 769 (2010) (reporting data finding that
senatorial votes on Supreme Court nominations by senators are shaped by state-level
public opinion).
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procedural roadblocks that Senate rules afford senators from the
minority party.81
The argument is one sounding in the tactical benefits of avoiding
candor.82 The same nominee presented to the Senate without using the
name affiliated with his or her jurisprudential approach does not
generate the costs imposed by political opponents. That nominee is
therefore more likely to become a judge promoting that approach if he
or she does not use the name affiliated with the approach when
nominated. Nominees that have the potential to promote the name of
the jurisprudence supported by the presidential administration would do
better to disavow their preferences in favor of neutral, technocratic
preferences.83
The additional costs of naming are also harder to endure for a
Democratic administration because of the supposed absence of political
supports. Overcoming the additional vetogates put in front of a naming
nominee requires constituencies who are willing to expend political
resources on judicial nominations. Interest groups like the Judicial
Crisis Network pledged to spend $10 million to secure the confirmation
of Neil Gorsuch to the Supreme Court.84 Republican primary voters
want to hear from their candidates that they will nominate committed
originalists to the bench.85 It is more challenging for the Democratic
Party to mobilize such efforts on behalf of judicial nominations.
The result is that the Obama Administration avoided this naming
dynamic. Their first judicial nominee was David Hamilton, nominated

81.
See, e.g., Carl Tobias, Sixth Circuit Federal Judicial Selection, 36 U.
CAL. DAVIS L. REV. 721, 735–36 (2003).
82.
See Micah Schwartzman, Judicial Sincerity, 94 VA. L. REV. 987, 1018
(2008) (explaining that candor may “require that judges disclose everything they believe
is relevant”).
83.
See President Obama Nominates Pamela Harris to Serve on the United
States
Court
of
Appeals,
WHITE
HOUSE
(May
8,
2014),
https://obamawhitehouse.archives.gov/the-press-office/2014/05/08/president-obamanominates-pamela-harris-serve-united-states-court-appeal
[https://perma.cc/56NYBXEF] (“Throughout her career, Pamela Harris has shown unwavering integrity and an
outstanding commitment to public service.”).
84.
See Burgess Everett, Conservatives Plan $10 Million High Court Ad
Campaign,
POLITICO
(Jan.
9,
2017,
5:13
AM),
http://www.politico.com/story/2017/01/supreme-court-trump-schumer-conservatives233315 [https://perma.cc/Z5F5-DZ7F].
85.
See Neil A. Lewis, The 2000 Campaign: The Judiciary; Presidential
Candidates Differ Sharply on Judges They Would Appoint to Top Courts, N.Y. TIMES
(Oct. 8, 2000), http://www.nytimes.com/2000/10/08/us/2000-campaign-judiciarypresidential-candidates-differ-sharply-judges-they-would.html [https://perma.cc/9U5DK6WC] (“Governor [George W.] Bush, after meeting with his advisers, decided to
offer an explicit and hard-to-mistake signal and said that the justices he most admired
were Antonin Scalia and Clarence Thomas.”).
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by President Obama to serve on the United States Court of Appeals for
the Seventh Circuit. Hamilton was selected precisely because he was
not affiliated with any overarching jurisprudential agenda.86 The
argument for not naming was one based in the logic of reciprocal
cooperation: by naming someone not affiliated with any liberal vision,
the goal of the Obama Administration was aiming to “reduce the
partisan contentiousness of judicial confirmation battles of recent
years.”87 Hamilton received the same treatment during his hearings and
in the votes in committee and on the Senate floor that a candidate more
known for and embracing naming would have received.88 The result
was simple: a respected Seventh Circuit judge but one without any
discernible benefit for an alternative vision of the law, and yet one who
required the same expenditure of political effort and generated the same
opposition as a naming judge.
This pattern recurred often during the eight years of the Obama
Administration. Nominees affiliated with the efforts to create a liberal
alternative to originalism were rarely seriously considered, let alone
nominated. When candidates like this were nominated, efforts were
immediately made to distance themselves from any naming efforts.
President Obama mentioned his desire for a justice that was guided by
empathy, defined as “understanding and identifying with people’s hopes
and struggles.”89 Justice Sotomayor, though, rejected the empathy label
and any other liberal name or jurisprudential vision during her
confirmation hearings.90

86.
See Lewis, supra note 19 (“The administration official said part of the
reason for making the Hamilton nomination the administration’s first public entry into
the often contentious field of judicial selection was to serve ‘as a kind of signal’ about
the kind of nominees Mr. Obama will select. The official spoke on the condition of
anonymity because the nomination had not been officially made.”); Toobin, supra note
19 (“The hope was that Hamilton’s appointment would begin a profound and rapid
change in the confirmation process and in the federal judiciary itself.”).
87.
Lewis, supra note 19.
88.
See David Fontana, Going Robe, NEW REPUBLIC (Sept. 16, 2009),
https://newrepublic.com/article/71929/going-robe [https://perma.cc/JS8L-6UJF].
89.
Press Briefing by Press Secretary Robert Gibbs, WHITE HOUSE
(May 1, 2009), https://obamawhitehouse.archives.gov/the-press-office/press-briefingpress-secretary-robert-gibbs-5-1-09 [https://perma.cc/Z7CN-9JPE] (statement of
President Obama).
90.
See Goldstein & Kane, supra note 52 (“The hearings were a moment of
history that liberals had awaited for 15 years: an opportunity for a Democratic
president’s Supreme Court nominee to inject into the public dialogue fresh ideas about
the Constitution and the law, beginning to recalibrate a court that has gravitated to the
right. Yet Sotomayor did not articulate such a vision. In answering Cardin, and in
scores of other times during four intense days in the witness chair, she eluded efforts of
Democrats and Republicans alike to draw out any statement of liberal thought.”).
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Goodwin Liu was actively involved in the American Constitution
Society for Law and Public Policy and widely known as a scholar
advocating progressive understandings of the Constitution. When he
was nominated to the Ninth Circuit, The Washington Post proclaimed
that his nomination “energized the left”91 because of these features of
his background. During his nomination process, Liu’s supporters
disavowed any sentiment like that—and Liu eventually did so himself.
Liu rejected Justice Sotomayor’s “wise Latina” remarks.92 He rejected
the idea of a “living Constitution.”93 He described himself as embracing
the originalist name, stating that he is committed to “the original
meaning of constitutional provisions where original meaning refers to
‘the underlying principles that the Framers’ words were publicly
understood to convey . . . .”94 He disavowed his own earlier argument
that the Constitution might reflect a concern with social and economic
inequalities.95
The absence of naming also creates its own incentive structure
within the field of judicial nominations. It is individually rational for
nominees to avoid naming even if it is not collectively rational for
presidential administrations to do so. The individual nominee who
names simply makes themselves the subject of a fire alarm and
increases their chances of being rejected for the federal bench. Interest
groups opposed to the candidate are mobilized because of the unusual
practice of a nominee engaging in naming. Interest groups can then
successfully mobilize senators to oppose the candidate. The nominees
who are confirmed are therefore those who do not name, which
incentivizes the President to nominate other nominees who do not
name.
The point of this Essay is that this rejection of naming was
tactically unwise. Refusing to name means that jurisprudence is being
played using the other team’s rulebook. Lawyers and judges are left
making arguments for their perspective using the linguistic and
rhetorical tools developed for the opposing perspective. Lawyers and

91.
See Robert Barnes, Law Professor Goodwin Liu May Be Test Case for
Obama
Judicial
Picks,
WASH.
POST
(Mar.
22,
2010),
http://www.washingtonpost.com/wpdyn/content/article/2010/03/21/AR2010032102581.html
[https://perma.cc/889NLPWU].
92.
Responses of Goodwin Liu, Nominee to be U.S. Circuit Judge for the
Ninth Circuit to the Written Questions of Senator Jeff Sessions 78, SENATE JUDICIARY
COMMITTEE, https://www.judiciary.senate.gov/imo/media/doc/GoodwinLiu-QFRs.pdf
[https://perma.cc/4ZYK-N469].
93.
See id. at 6.
94.
Id. at 31.
95.
Id. at 3, 43.
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judges are left to communicate to their political and public supporters—
let alone their legal ones—using the tools that are known to be utilized
previously by their strongest opponents. Lawyers and judges desire to
make arguments that can be considered “off the wall” because their
perspectives have not been named and therefore elaborated.
The failure to name during the judicial nominations process of the
Obama Administration was a substantial lost opportunity. The past
decade has featured the most sustained effort among liberal academics,
judges, and justices to devise a name and a vision for their
jurisprudence in at least a generation. The first year of the Obama
Administration featured an edited book by Jack Balkin and Reva Siegel
entitled The Constitution in 2020, featuring a series of essays meant to
respond to the Reagan Administration’s blueprint The Constitution in
2000.96 Justice Stephen Breyer authored a book in 200597 and then one
again in 2011 meant to provide a liberal alternative to originalism.98
Jack M. Balkin’s book Living Originalism in 2011 likewise aimed to
provide scaffolding for a liberal jurisprudential vision.99 These attempts
to provide a name and a vision did not feature in the remarks of
President Obama’s judicial nominees, who instead largely either raised
the names and visions associated with originalism and umpires, or
responded to questions about them. Contrast that with the energy
surrounding originalism in the 1980’s, and how that energy was
manifested through confirmation hearings like those of Bork to the
Supreme Court in 1987.
This is not only a problematic state of affairs for a Democratic
administration, but an unnecessary one. The evidence suggests that
naming does not clearly elicit greater obstruction in a political
environment as polarized as the present one. Supreme Court
nominations are a unique political animal, but in the past era naming
did not seem to matter that much, except on the extremes with Bork.
An ideologically diverse cohort of Supreme Court Justices since 1955
have been unanimously confirmed or confirmed with close to no

96.
THE CONSTITUTION IN 2020, supra note 43, at 1–7.
97.
See Michael W. McConnell, Active Liberty: A Progressive Alternative to
Textualism and Originalism?, 119 HARV. L. REV. 2387, 2389 (2006) (reviewing
STEPHEN J. BREYER, ACTIVE LIBERTY: INTERPRETING OUR CONSTITUTION (2005))
(noting how Breyer is attempting to articulate an alternative theoretical infrastructure).
98.
See David Fontana, Stephan Breyer’s “Making Democracy Work,”
Reviewed
by
David
Fontana,
WASH.
POST.
(Oct.
3,
2010),
http://www.washingtonpost.com/wpdyn/content/article/2010/10/01/AR2010100103520.html
[https://perma.cc/6RXG4XAF].
99.
See JACK M. BALKIN, LIVING ORIGINALISM 277–80 (2011).
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opposition.100 Now, naming does not matter much because partisanship
predicts Supreme Court confirmation votes rather than these votes
being unanimous or close to it. Notice, for instance, the unified
opposition by the Republican Senate to confirming the eminently
qualified Merrick Garland to the Supreme Court in 2016. Garland had
purposefully avoided affiliation with any efforts to name and promote a
liberal jurisprudential vision.101
For lower court nominations, naming likewise seems not to
generate substantially greater opposition because partisanship is what
matters. Nominees like David Hamilton—likewise focused on technical
qualifications and not jurisprudential causes102—were opposed on a
party-line basis. Hamilton was filibustered by Senate Republicans,
voted out of committee on a party-line vote, and confirmed 59-39 (with
only one Republican senator, his longtime supporter Richard Lugar,
voting for him).
Selecting nominees that engage in naming generates political
supports that do not exist rather than relying on fixed political supports
that do not exist. Voters follow the priming of the leaders of their
political parties.103 Richard Nixon campaigned against the Warren
Court and argued that judges should “interpret the law, not make the
law.”104 The Reagan Administration made a particular view of the
judicial role a central part of its agenda.105 George W. Bush told
Republican primary voters the two models for a Supreme Court
nominee in his Administration,106 and then-candidate Trump provided
Republican primary voters with a list of twenty-one conservative judges
he would consider for his Supreme Court nominee.107 After all, a
100.
Harry Blackmum, John Paul Stevens, Anthony Kennedy, Sandra Day
O’Connor, and Antonin Scalia were unanimously confirmed, and Ruth Bader Ginsburg
and Stephen Breyer faced minimal opposition. See Geoffrey Stone, Understanding
Supreme Court Confirmations, 2010 SUP. CT. REV. 381, 389–90 (2011).
101.
See Carl Hulse, Supreme Court Showdown Could Shape
Fall
Elections,
N.Y.
TIMES
(Mar.
16,
2016),
https://www.nytimes.com/2016/03/17/us/politics/supreme-court-nomination-obamacongress.html?_r=0 [https://perma.cc/YTJ2-B22R].
102.
See supra note 86 and accompanying text.
103.
For a nice summary, see Robert B. Cialdini et al., A Focus Theory of
Normative Conduct: Recycling the Concept of Norms to Reduce Littering in Public
Places, 58 J. PERSONALITY & SOC. PSYCHOL. 1015, 1024–25 (1990).
104.
See O’NEILL, supra note 41, at 96 (quoting President Nixon).
105.
See Teles, supra note 34.
106.
See Lewis, supra note 85 (“Governor [George W.] Bush, after meeting
with his advisers, decided to offer an explicit and hard-to-mistake signal and said that
the justices he most admired were Antonin Scalia and Clarence Thomas.”),
107.
See Adam Liptak, Trump’s Supreme Court List: Ivy League? Out. The
Heartland?
In.,
N.Y.
TIMES
(Nov.
14,
2016),
https://www.nytimes.com/2016/11/15/us/politics/trump-supreme-court-justices.html

FONTANA – FORTHCOMING – WISCONSIN LAW REVIEW (2017)

122

3/28/2017

WISCONSIN LAW REVIEW

Supreme Court with eight Republican nominees refused to overrule Roe
v. Wade,108 and a Supreme Court with five Republican nominees found
a right to same-sex marriage in the Constitution,109 so conservatives
were already primed to care about judicial nominations.
A candidate that names an approach to the law can create precisely
the cognitive prime to generate similar political resources on the
political left. A nominee known previously for his or her devotion to
naming who then engages in naming during their confirmation process
signals to their supporters the sincerity and seriousness of his or her
devotion to the jurisprudential cause.110 The name itself that he or she
uses can motivate and mobilize supporters more. The importance of
“empathy” in judging and the benefits of a “wise Latina” on the bench
are arguments that resonate with liberal styles of political reasoning and
would motivate political liberals. If originalism was meant to motivate
those who believe in literalism and those who believe in a better past
wrongly distorted by the complicated present,111 then liberal names can
motivate those who believe in the importance of diversity and inclusion,
even when federal judges interpret legal texts.
This naming by nominees can compensate for in motivation what
has been the absence of salient Supreme Court harms to motivate the
progressive cause. The most widely known Supreme Court cases are all
progressive victories.112 Cases like United States v. Lopez113 did not
generate the practical implications that conservatives desired and

[https://perma.cc/3JQ8-4X9Z] (“When Donald J. Trump issued his final list of 21
potential nominees to the Supreme Court in September, he made a vow. ‘This list is
definitive,’ he said, “and ‘I will choose only from it in picking future Justices of the
Supreme Court.’”).
108.
Planned Parenthood of Se. Pa. v. Casey, 505 U.S. 833, 845–46 (1992).
109.
Obergefell v. Hodges, 135 S. Ct. 2584, 2585 (2015).
110.
Kahan, supra note 36, at 73 (noting how these names serve as “signals
that are received by intermediary groups—including politicians and media
commentators—who then amplify and retransmit them to members of the cultural
groups who look to them for guidance”).
111.
See Greene, supra note 36, at 704–09 (highlighting the appeal of
originalism); Peter J. Smith & Robert W. Tuttle, Biblical Literalism and Constitutional
Originalism, 86 NOTRE DAME L. REV. 693 (2011) (making similar arguments).
112.
See Paul Bedard, Poll: Roe v. Wade Most Well-Known Case, Only 34%
Know ‘Bush v. Gore,’ WASH. EXAMINER (Oct. 1, 2015, 12:05 PM),
http://www.washingtonexaminer.com/poll-roe-v.-wade-most-well-known-case-only-34know-bush-vs.-gore/article/2573195 [https://perma.cc/6V4V-VAR2] (reporting that the
most well-known conservative win in the Supreme Court was Bush v. Gore, known by
only one-in-three respondents).
113.
514 U.S. 549 (1995).
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progressives feared.114 Citizens United v. F.E.C. might serve as the
progressive Roe v. Wade in the future.115
The Senate’s refusal to vote on Merrick Garland could be the
appointments-related cause that mobilizes progressives in the way that
Bork’s defeat mobilized conservatives. Garland, though, was not a
mobilizing defeat in the way that Bork’s defeat was.116 Garland was a
creature of the Washington legal establishment, rather than a lawyer or
judge dedicating to branding and directing that legal establishment with
naming or jurisprudence.117
One other note on naming is in order. Naming can be effective
even if the nominee engaged in the task does not have a realistic chance
of being confirmed—because, for instance, the Senate is controlled by
the party opposing the President (as it was for President Obama his last
two years in office). The Bork nomination is a great example of this.
Even in defeat, it consolidated conservative senators and interest groups
behind originalism, and gave originalism a microphone louder than it
had ever had previously. As Douglas NeJaime has written about
litigation, there can even be a unique value in losing legal battles.118

114.
See Edward L. Rubin, Puppy Federalism and the Blessings of America,
574 ANNALS AM. ACAD. POL. & SOC. SCI. 37, 38 (2001) (describing Lopez as “puppy
federalism” because “like puppy love, it looks somewhat authentic but does not reflect
the intense desires that give the real thing its inherent meaning”).
115.
See Matea Gold & Anne Gearan, Hillary Clinton’s Litmus Test for
Supreme Court Nominees: A Pledge to Overturn Citizens United, WASH. POST (May
14, 2015), https://www.washingtonpost.com/news/post-politics/wp/2015/05/14/hillaryclintons-litmus-test-for-supreme-court-nominees-a-pledge-to-overturn-citizensunited/?utm_term=.86d49093264f [https://perma.cc/U9LB-49DN] (“Hillary Clinton
told a group of her top fundraisers Thursday that if she is elected president, her
nominees to the Supreme Court will have to share her belief that the court's 2010
Citizens United decision must be overturned.”).
116.
See Editorial Board, Merrick Garland for the Supreme Court, N.Y.
TIMES (Mar. 16, 2016), https://www.nytimes.com/2016/03/17/opinion/merrickgarland-for-the-supreme-court.html [https://perma.cc/MRM3-ERCW] (“If you tried to
create the ideal moderate Supreme Court nominee in a laboratory, it would be hard to
do better than Judge Merrick Garland.”).
117.
See Sheryl Gay Stolberg et al., Merrick Garland is a Deft Navigator of
Washington’s
Legal
Circles,
N.Y.
TIMES
(Mar.
26,
2016),
https://www.nytimes.com/2016/03/27/us/politics/merrick-garland-obama-supremecourtnominee.html?mtrref=www.google.com&gwh=3C5AA676B671BB05FD4A29C54C2
AF505&gwt=pay [https://perma.cc/6D94-7G7D] (“[I]t became clear over time that
Mr. Garland was silently working out his arguments, processing facts and testing
alternatives. Surrounded by overachievers in a city full of people clamoring to be
heard, he was waiting until he had something to say.”).
118.
See Douglas NeJaime, Winning Through Losing, 96 IOWA L. REV. 941,
941 (2006) (“Sophisticated advocates may use litigation loss (1) to construct
organizational identity and (2) to mobilize constituents.”).
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II. NUMBING

One other dimension of nominations accomodationism has to do
with what I will call “numbing.” Not all potential or actual nominees
are created equal. Presidential administrations and their supporters can
use unusually provocative nominees with great power. An
administration or its supporters can “plant” the name of a potential
extreme nominee in the media,119 or actually nominate that candidate.
This numbs the political system by generating nominee “extremeness
aversion.”120 Political resources are directed towards opposing this
nominee or ensuring that no additional similar nominees are selected,
thereby directing oppositional resources away from other potential or
actual nominees. Political elites and public opinion are cognitively
distorted by the possibility of this nominee, making other nominees
seem less objectionable.
Many features of a potential or actual nominee can make him or
her unusually provocative. Because of his or her youthful age, a
nominee can be significant because he or she will serve on the bench
for a long time and could be nominated to a higher position at a later
time.121 When President George W. Bush nominated Miguel Estrada to
the United States Court of Appeals for the District of Columbia Circuit
in 2001, the fact that he was only thirty-nine years old made him an
unusually threatening nominee to the Democratic Party.122 Potential or
actual nominees that have a prior profile that is significant enough to
give them a potentially outsized microphone from the bench can also be
unusually provocative. Nominating Robert Bork to the Supreme Court
in 1987—given his prior work on originalism—made him unusually

119.
See David E. Pozen, The Leaky Leviathan: Why The Government
Condemns and Condones Unlawful Disclosures of Information, 127 HARV. L. REV.
512, 534 (2013) (“Plants are taken to be ‘authorized’ disclosures designed to advance
administration interests and goals. Leaks are ‘unauthorized’ disclosures.”) (citations
omitted).
120.
For a discussion of extremeness aversion more generally, see Itamar
Simonson & Amos Tversky, Choice in Context: Tradeoff Contrast
and Extremeness Aversion, 29 J. MARKETING RES. 281 (1992). See also Mark Kelman
et al., Context-Dependence in Legal Decision Making, 25 J. LEGAL STUD. 287 (1996)
(considering extremeness aversion in the legal context).
121.
See Fontana & Schwartzman, supra note 11 (identifying the importance
of nominating younger judges).
122.
See Mark Greenbaum, Double Take, NEW REPUBLIC (May 2, 2010),
https://newrepublic.com/article/74728/double-take [https://perma.cc/CNF3-L7LC] (“The
same qualities that had earned him a nomination—his youth, political leanings, and
minority background—perversely worked against him: Fearing that Estrada would sit atop
a list of possible Supreme Court picks once he became a judge, Senate Democrats waged
a harsh two-year campaign against him.”).
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provocative.123 Potential or actual nominees that promise to be more
jurisprudentially extreme can also be unusually provocative. When
President Trump was considering William J. Pryor for the Supreme
Court in 2017, commentators described him as “the most polarizing”
potential nominee because of many provocative comments over the
years,124 including his testimony before the Senate Judiciary Committee
when nominated to the Eleventh Circuit that Roe v. Wade had led to the
“slaughter of millions of unborn children.”125
Numbing has several tactical benefits. First, numbing directs
resources towards the potential or actual extreme nominee and away
from other nominees. Opposition interest groups conduct opposition
research on that potential nominee to be able to demonstrate how
extreme that potential nominee is.126 Opposition interest groups solicit
contributions from their supporters by mentioning their efforts to
prevent and/or defeat that nominee. Senators from the opposing party
inform the administration of the problems with such an extreme
nominee. The media features stories documenting the extreme
jurisprudential perspectives of the potential nominee, and get prominent
sources on the record to state that this potential nominee is extreme.
Meanwhile, other potential nominees benefit from the resources
expended on the extreme nominee by not facing the same degree of
scrutiny. Opposition interest groups have not compiled the dossier on
or motivated their supporters to oppose other nominees. Senators have
not signaled to the administration their sentiments on other nominees,
leaving an administration capable of claiming less opposition for that
nominee. Media coverage of other nominees explicitly or implicitly
contrasts them with the more extreme nominee.

123.
See Bruce Ackerman, Transformative Appointments, 101 HARV. L. REV.
1164, 1164 (1988) (“[W]hen judged by normal personal and professional criteria,
Robert Bork is among the best qualified candidates for the Supreme Court of this or any
other era.”).
124.
See Kimberly Kindy, Pryor: Perhaps the Most Polarizing Supreme Court
Justice
Possibility,
WASH.
POST
(Jan.
30,
2017),
https://www.washingtonpost.com/national/pryor-perhaps-the-most-polarizing-supremecourt-justice-possibility/2017/01/28/f25bb7e2-e4ae-11e6-ba1163c4b4fb5a63_story.html?utm_term=.fb1ef15d8eda [https://perma.cc/VKL6-LGXG].
125.
See Opinion, Beyond the Pale, N.Y. TIMES (June 23, 2003),
http://www.nytimes.com/2003/06/23/opinion/beyond-the-pale.html
[https://perma.cc/RR7L-J44M].
126.
See Scherer, Bartels & Steigerwalt, supra note 79 (“[W]e theorize that a
principal function of interest groups in the lower court confirmation process is to act as
‘fire marshals’ for the Senate. By alerting the Senate to problematic nominees, interest
groups aid the Senate in its constitutional mission under Article II to provide ‘advice
and consent’ to the president on all life-tenured federal court nominations.”).
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Second, numbing shapes elite and public sentiments towards the
actual or potential nominee. Political attention rarely focuses on judicial
nominees, particularly for the lower federal courts. Interest groups
sound the “fire alarm” that the nominee is extreme.127 When these same
citizens hear that the fire did not transpire—that the extreme nominee
was not nominated or that relatively few extreme nominees were
selected—they are less concerned about the other nominees. After Bork
was defeated, a conservative federal judge like Douglas Ginsburg did
not seem as extreme.128 Likewise, after President Trump did not
nominate Pryor, a conservative federal judge like Neil Gorsuch did not
seem as extreme.129
Numbing also has a signaling benefit for the president. It signals to
relevant lawyers and judges what jurisprudential perspectives are “on
the wall” and “off the wall.”130 Lawyers aspiring to judicial (or other)
nominations in that administration is thereby authorized to move
jurisprudentially towards the extreme nominee, since that extreme
nominee was at least considered—and was possibly nominated—for a
powerful federal judicial position. Empirical studies have demonstrated
that judges behave strategically when desiring elevation, so the trickledown effects on state judges or lower federal courts seeking elevation
could be substantial.131
Consider, for instance, the situation surrounding George W.
Bush’s nomination of Janice Rogers Brown to the D.C. Circuit. Brown
was described as manifesting “evidence of extremism.”132 Brown had
described liberalism as flawed in the same way that slavery was.133
While one or two senators will often attended many hearings for
presidential nominees, senatorial attention to Brown was substantial.

127.
Scherer, Bartels & Steigerwalt, supra note 78, at 1026.
128.
See Robert Pear & Jeff Gerth, Court Choice in Focus: A Portrait of
Ginsburg, N.Y. TIMES (Nov. 1, 1987), http://www.nytimes.com/1987/11/01/us/courtchoice-in-focus-a-portrait-of-ginsburg.html?pagewanted=all [https://perma.cc/FFK2FZ2W] (covering Ginsburg’s nomination by asking whether he is “another Bork” and
quoting one expert as stating “on the social agenda, I think he’s no Bork”).
129.
See Kindy, supra note 124 (contrasting Gorsuch with Pryor by labeling
Gorsuch not as “polarizing” as Pryor).
130.
See Jack M. Balkin, How Social Movements Change (Or Fail To Change)
the Constitution: The Case of the New Departure, 39 SUFFOLK U. L. REV. 27, 28
(2005).
131.
See Ryan C. Black & Ryan J. Owens, Courting the President: How
Circuit Court Judges Alter Their Behavior for Promotion to the Supreme Court, 60 AM.
J. POL. SCI. 30 (2016) (finding such effects).
132.
David D. Kirkpatrick, New Judge Sees Slavery in Liberalism, N.Y. TIMES
(June 9, 2005), http://www.nytimes.com/2005/06/09/politics/new-judge-sees-slaveryin-liberalism.html?_r=0 [https://perma.cc/LBJ8-PD7G].
133.
See id.
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Senator Dick Durbin from Illinois, one of the leaders of the Senate
Democrats, attended her hearings with many prepared and complicated
questions.134 Then-Senator Barack Obama made a speech from the
Senate floor opposing Brown.135 The list of those on the record before
the Senate opposing her nomination was enormous and unusual.136
This distraction generated lesser scrutiny for other candidates the
Senate was considering around the same time. Senate Democrats during
the Bush Administration focused their opposition on provocative
nominees like Brown and Pryor, and were forced to justify this
obstruction by noting that “the Senate has confirmed dozens of judicial
nominees with little or no debate.”137 Nominees that would normally be
provocative sailed through the confirmation process—relatively
speaking at least—because the system had been numbed by nominees
like Brown and Pryor. Diane Sykes, later considered a strongly
conservative federal judge on the Seventh Circuit, was confirmed 70-27
without anywhere near the opposition while Brown and Pryor’s
nominations were pending.138 Brett Kavanaugh, a young and talented
Bush White House staffer, was nominated in January of 2006 with
much fanfare and controversy.139 The opposition resources he consumed
meant those resources were not directed at another young and talented
nominee, Neil Gorsuch—later to be nominated to the Supreme Court—
who sailed through on a voice vote.

134.
Judgment Call: The Nomination of Justice Roger Brown; The Economist’s
Bill Emmott; Faith and the Law; Polio, MOYERS & CO. (Oct. 31, 2003)
http://billmoyers.com/content/judgement-call-economist-bill-emmott-wendykaminer2faith-law-polio/ [https://perma.cc/R74F-DH8D].
135.
151 CONG. REC. S6,178–80 (daily ed. June 8, 2005) (statement of Sen.
Obama).
136.
See id. at S218.
137.
See Carl Hulse & David Stout, Embattled Estrada Withdraws as Nominee
for
Federal
Bench,
N.Y.
TIMES
(Sept.
4,
2003),
http://www.nytimes.com/2003/09/04/politics/embattled-estrada-withdraws-as-nomineefor-federal-bench.html [https://perma.cc/FDX8-XPM2].
138.
See Kevin Russell & Charles Davis, Potential Nominee Profile: William
Pryor
(Expanded),
SCOTUSBLOG
(Jan.
10,
2017,
3:35
PM),
http://www.scotusblog.com/2017/01/potential-nominee-profile-william-pryor
[https://perma.cc/3729-526F] (“President-elect Donald Trump mentioned . . . [Sykes]
by name during a primary debate shortly after Scalia’s death . . . .”).
139.
See Neil A. Lewis, Bush Aide on Court Nominees Faces Fire Himself,
N.Y. TIMES (Apr. 28, 2004), http://www.nytimes.com/2004/04/28/us/bush-aide-oncourt-nominees-faces-fire-as-nominee-himself.html
[https://perma.cc/SS6P-GGN5]
(“So when Mr. Kavanaugh came before the Senate Judiciary Committee on Tuesday as
a nominee himself for an appeals court post, no one was surprised when he was
verbally batted around by the panel’s Democrats, who have complained that Mr. Bush
is trying to tilt the nation's courts rightward.”).
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Other actual nominees had written records that suggested a
jurisprudential perspective so provocative that they also distorted
perspectives of the ideological positions of other nominees. When
President Trump considered Pryor for the Supreme Court, progressive
interest groups like the Alliance for Justice went on the record opposing
Pryor specifically as ideologically extreme.140 The New York Times
favorably contrasted Gorsuch with Pryor, whose “credentials, erudition
and more muted stances” were discussed “as compared with Judge
Pryor.”141
For the cooperative political actor, numbing is problematic. A
youthful nominee is meant to capture a scarce seat on the federal bench
potentially for half a century, meaning that many later presidents—
including presidents of the opposing political party—will not have the
opportunity to select their own preferred candidate for that seat. A
prominent nominee will use his or her seat to criticize the
jurisprudential perspective of the opposing party for decades to come.
The standard statement issued by senators is that nominees will be
evaluated to ensure they are within the mainstream,142 and so
provocative nominees violate that announced standard.
The logic, therefore, of rejecting numbing is that it generates
additional political costs without any corresponding political benefits.
Members of the opposing party are provoked by these nominees. Think
of, for instance, the greater attention and opposition that Bork elicited.
This is true of the lower federal courts as well. The Senate filibuster for
lower court nominations was abolished by Senate Democrats because of
its usage by Republicans against nominees like Liu.
The Obama Administration therefore largely rejected the numbing
strategy, purposefully, and from the beginning of its time in office.143
Nominees like Hamilton were put forward because they were not
extreme. In his second term, President Obama did utilize numbing
more frequently. Nina Pillard was nominated to the D.C. Circuit the
same day and at the same ceremony as the more establishment
Washington lawyer Patricia Millett and sitting federal judge Robert
140.
See Kindy, supra note 124 (contrasting Gorsuch with Pryor by labeling
Gorsuch not as “polarizing” as Pryor).
141.
See Michael D. Shear & Adam Liptak, A Supreme Court Pick is
Promised. A Political Brawl is Certain, N.Y. TIMES (Jan. 24, 2017),
https://www.nytimes.com/2017/01/24/us/politics/supreme-court-nominees-trump.html
[https://perma.cc/Z29Z-LDJN].
142.
See The Latest: White House Plans Major Outreach by Gorsuch, DENVER
POST (Jan. 31, 2017, 8:40 PM), http://www.denverpost.com/2017/01/31/trump-neilgorsuch-supreme-court/ [https://perma.cc/6ACD-JLZC] (quoting Senate Minority
Leader Charles Schumer, D-NY).
143.
See Lewis, supra note 19 and accompanying text.
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Wilkins.144 Pillard immediately galvanized opposition from
conservatives, thereby distracting attention from Millett and Wilkins.145
The tactical merits of Obama Administration’s reticence to engage
in numbing more often are questionable. The political costs of a
provocative nominee are not necessarily any greater than the political
costs of any nominee. Senate opposition to candidates can be based on a
manufactured sense that a judicial nominee is provocative, even if he or
she is not. The opposition to Liu, for instance, was based on a sense
from his scholarly writings that he could be more aggressive as a
progressive judge.146 His age (thirty-nine at the time of his nomination)
and his political connections (he was a co-author of an article with
Hillary Clinton147) suggested a potentially influential judge who could
later be elevated to the Supreme Court. David Hamilton, by contrast,
was selected by President Obama precisely because he did not seem
provocative.148 However, conservative groups described him as having
a “pretty clear leftist record” and labeled him the first pro-abortion
judicial candidate nominated by President Obama.149
Meanwhile, the political supports behind the President’s nominee
can be even greater with a candidate meant to numb the opposition.
Political supports are often built in support of or opposition to cases—
144.
Michael D. Shear & Jeremy W. Peters, Judicial Picks Set the Stage for a
Battle
in
the
Senate,
N.Y.
TIMES
(June
4,
2013),
http://www.nytimes.com/2013/06/05/us/politics/obama-to-name-3-to-top-appeals-courtin-challenge-to-republicans.html?hp [https://perma.cc/3A2L-QS7S].
145.
See Sergio Munoz, Working Moms’ Family Planning is Extreme and
Radical: Right-Wing Attacks on Judicial Nominee Jump to Fox, MEDIAMATTERS (Nov.
25, 2013, 5:43 PM), https://mediamatters.org/blog/2013/11/25/working-moms-familyplanning-is-extreme-and-rad/197053 [https://perma.cc/WFP4-3UUU] (quoting Carrie
Severino of the conservative Judicial Crisis Network stating that “Nina Pillard is
probably the most extreme judge that has been nominated for this court and possibly for
any court in the country”); see, e.g., Grunwald, supra note 20 (reporting that “White
House sources” had “figured [Pillard] . . . would be a sacrificial lamb, a scalp
Republicans could claim while confirming Millett, an uncontroversial appellate lawyer,
and hopefully Wilkins, an African-American judge who had been confirmed
unanimously to the D.C. district court in 2010”).
146.
See Robert Barnes, supra note 91 (“[Liu] is an outspoken advocate of
liberal causes, including same-sex marriage and affirmative action.”).
147.
See Hillary Rodham Clinton & Goodwin Liu, Separation Anxiety:
Congress, The Courts, and The Constitution, 91 GEO. L.J. 439 (2003).
148.
See Toobin, supra note 19 (“Hamilton had been vetted with care. After
fifteen years of service on the trial bench, he had won the highest rating from the
American Bar Association; Richard Lugar, the senior senator from Indiana and a
leading Republican, was supportive; and Hamilton’s status as a nephew of Lee
Hamilton, a well-respected former local congressman, gave him deep connections.”).
149.
See Steven Ertelt, President Barack Obama Makes First Pro-Abortion
Judicial Pick in David Hamilton, LIFENEWS (Mar. 17, 2009, 9:00 AM),
http://www.lifenews.com/2009/03/17/nat-4920/ [https://perma.cc/8G9Q-BS7X].
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such as Roe v. Wade—but also in response to nominees like Robert
Bork. Just like a plaintiff like James Obergefell or Lily Ledbetter, a
provocative nominee puts a face and a story on a perspective on the
law. So, for instance, the nomination of Liu, according to The
Washington Post, “energized the left.”150 Newspapers reported his
inspiring personal story,151 just as they had done about Miguel Estrada
(the Bush D.C. Circuit nominee) nearly a decade earlier.152 The
provocative nominee provides additional political resources, rather than
minimizing them.
Consider public opinion regarding the nomination of Merrick
Garland to the Supreme Court in 2016. Garland was not the
jurisprudentially transformative figure that Bork was or another
nominee could have been. The refusal of Senate Republicans to
consider his nomination, though, made him a cause celebre.
Republicans had long been a party more focused on judicial
nominations. Polling during the 2016 presidential election, though,
found that members of both parties agreed almost equally with the
statement that it “was very important to them personally” what
happened with the opening on the Supreme Court created by the
untimely death of Justice Antonin Scalia.153
III. NUMBERS
Another effective but aggressive strategy in nominating judges that
remained relatively under-utilized during the Obama Administration
compared to the Bush Administration was simultaneously to nominate
large numbers of federal judges simultaneously.154 The numbers

150.
Barnes, supra note 91.
151.
See id. (“Born to Taiwanese immigrants, he learned English at schools in
the South before attending Stanford, where he was a Rhodes Scholar, and Yale Law
School. He clerked for Justice Ruth Bader Ginsburg, worked in the Clinton
administration and became active in education reform. Liu won a distinguished teaching
award at the University of California's Berkeley School of Law and was promoted to
associate dean.”).
152.
See Hulse & Stout, supra note 137 (referencing Estrada as “[a] Honduran
immigrant and a graduate of Harvard Law School”).
153.
See GARLAND NOMINATION TO SUPREME COURT GETS POSITIVE REACTION
FROM
THE
PUBLIC,
PEW
RES.
CTR.
(2016),
http://www.peoplepress.org/files/2016/03/3-28-2016-Supreme-Court-release.pdf [https://perma.cc/7ACDVY9Y].
154.
This point is essentially about the nomination of lower court judges.
President Obama nominated two Justices to the United States Supreme Court, but these
nominations could not have been simultaneous because Justice John Paul Stevens did
not resign until after Sonia Sotomayor had been confirmed. See Letter from John Paul
Stevens, Supreme Court Justice, to Barack Obama, President (April 9, 2010),
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strategy is one more applicable to the nomination of judges below the
level of the Supreme Court. Discussions about judicial nominations
focus almost exclusively on the total number of federal judges
nominated by a President.155 The distribution of these nominations
across political time is also important. Presidential administrations that
nominate larger volumes of judges simultaneously generate greater
oversight costs for the opposing party in the Senate and their supportive
interest groups. Scarce political capital for the opposing party is
depleted rapidly and substantially by more nominees, while political
capital in support of these nominees is ready and potentially increased
because of more nominees. Larger volumes of simultaneous nominees
also generate pressure to confirm some significant number of these
nominees, so as to blunt any problematic narrative about Senate
obstruction.
The scarcity of political resources is a definitional feature of
political life. The expenditure of political resources generates both a
direct cost and an opportunity cost taxing these scarce resources.
Political actors only have so many resources to investigate a policy and
decide their position on that policy. Political actors only have so many
resources to persuade other stakeholders of their position on that policy.
Political actors only have so many resources to generate public attention
for and move public opinion towards their position on that policy.
Scarcity means that resources invested in one policy dimension can
become asset-specific resources, not readily transferable to deploy to
address some other policy dimension.156
Scarcity can be a particular challenge for those in political
opposition because of the first-mover advantage of many of those in
power.157 When a political actor proposes a policy, it is often the
https://www.supremecourt.gov/publicinfo/press/JPSLetter.pdf [https://perma.cc/F5ETMT5X] (“I shall retire from regular active service as an Associate Justice.”).
155.
See, e.g., Carl Tobias, Filing the Appellate Court Vacancies, 17 U. PA.
J. CONST. L. 1, 1 (2015) (“President Obama has named more judges than Presidents
George W. Bush and Bill Clinton had at this juncture in their tenure, while courts of
appeals currently have the fewest openings since 1990.”); Grunwald, supra note 20
(“Obama has already appointed 329 judges to lifetime jobs, more than one third of the
judiciary.”).
156.
See Peter Alexis Gourevitch, The Governance Problem in International
Relations, in STRATEGIC CHOICE AND INTERNATIONAL RELATIONS 137, 144–45 (David
A. Lake & Robert Powell eds., 1999) (“Political actors develop investments, ‘specific
assets,’ in a particular arrangement—relationships, expectations, privileges, knowledge
of procedures, all tied to the institutions at work. . . . [This] helps to explain
institutional persistence. [A]ctors . . . have incentives to protect their investment by
opposing change.”).
157.
See Terry M. Moe & William G. Howell, The Presidential Power of
Unilateral Action, 15 J.L. ECON. & ORG. 132, 138 (1999) (“[P]residents are
particularly well suited to be first-movers . . . . The other branches are then presented
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culmination of an investment of substantial resources in the
development of that policy. That initial investment has yielded
epistemic and stakeholder infrastructure to defend that policy once
announced. The opponent of that policy, meanwhile, is put on the
defensive, left to generate and consolidate his or her resources
immediately or face rapid defeat and/or claims of obstruction of the
policy. The political science literature about the power of setting the
agenda, for instance, finds unsurprisingly that those in power set the
agenda in a way that leaves the opposition disadvantaged.158 Because of
the scarcity of their political resources, opponents are usually left
pulling the “fire alarm” for only the most problematic of political
actions engaged in by the majority.159
Judicial nominations are susceptible to this same logic of scarcity
in opposition. The primary opposition to the president’s judicial
nominations within government come from members of the opposing
party on the Senate Judiciary Committee. The docket of that committee
is sufficiently large that judicial nominations are just one small part of
the issues that members of that Committee are considering.160 There are
only roughly nine senators and maybe double that number of lawyers
working for those senators for the opposition party on the Senate
Judiciary Committee. There are interest groups active on judicial
nominations—such as the Alliance for Justice on the left and the
Judicial Crisis Network on the right—but there are not many of them.161
There are interest groups that focus on a range of issues, including
judicial nominations, such as the AFL-CIO.162 For those working on

with a fait accompli, and it is up to them to respond. If they are unable to respond
effectively, or decide not to, the president wins by default. And even if they do
respond, which could take years, he may still get much of what he wants anyway.”).
158.
For a discussion of the power of agenda-setting, see FRANK R.
BAUMGARTNER & BRYAN D. JONES, AGENDAS AND INSTABILITY IN AMERICAN POLITICS
(2d ed. 2009).
159.
See Mathew D. McCubbins & Thomas Schwartz, Congressional
Oversight Overlooked: Police Patrols Versus Fire Alarms, 28 AM. J. POL. SCI. 165,
166 (1984) (defining “fire alarms” in conducing oversight as reviewing just the most
problematic of actions).
160.
See
Jurisdiction,
COMM.
ON
JUDICIARY,
https://www.judiciary.senate.gov/about/jurisdiction
[https://perma.cc/7JWL-M6X2]
(defining committee jurisdiction as “providing oversight” and “consideration of
nominations and legislation, resolutions, messages, petitions, memorials and other
matters”) (last visited Mar. 13, 2017).
161.
See Scherer, Bartels & Steigerwalt, supra note 78, at 1028 (listing some
of the groups most actively involved in judicial nominations).
162.
See AFL-CIO, THE SENATE SHOULD DO ITS JOB ON
FEDERAL
JUDICIAL
APPOINTMENTS
(2016),
http://www.aflcio.org/content/download/174597/4155029/file/The%20Senate%20Shoul
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judicial nominations, it can be easier generating public attention related
to a Supreme Court nomination,163 but not for lower court nominations,
making the task of mobilizing a larger opposition to a nomination quite
challenging.
The first-mover advantage can also be large for judicial
nominations. If one of the senators from the state of the judicial
nomination is both from the opposing party and on the Senate Judiciary
Committee, then the opposition party will have advance notice of the
nominee and an opportunity to prepare opposition to that nominee.
Otherwise, the president and his or her supporters in the Senate will
have extensive background information available to them about the
nominee at the moment of the nomination, while opponents will be left
scrambling to learn about the nominee. Because our federal judicial
system is geographically distributed,164 Senate lawyers and supportive
interest groups in Washington can be left researching a trial lawyer in
Idaho nominated to the federal district court there. A nominee like
David Souter or Harriet Miers leaves opponents scrambling.165
A judicial nomination is often the culmination of a process of
lining up supporters rather than the beginning of that process. Before
announcing a nominee, the president’s staff will not just look into
candidates from within the administration, but also line up supporters
outside of the administration. Organizations like the Alliance for Justice
or the Federalist Society for Law and Public Policy are consulted prior
d%20Do%20Its%20Job%20on%20Federal%20Judicial%20Appointments%20%20FINAL.pdf [https://perma.cc/C97D-2FZW].
163.
See GIBSON & CALDEIRA, supra note 56, at 71–72 (finding that
approximately three-quarters of Americans reported that it was important that their
senators vote “correctly”); James G. Gimpel & Robin M. Wolpert, Opinion-Holding
and Public Attitudes Toward Controversial Supreme Court Nominees, 49 POL. RES. Q.
163, 164 (1996) (reporting that senatorial vote on Supreme Court nominations shaped
their vote total in subsequent elections); Kastellec et al., supra note 80 (reporting statelevel data finding effects on senatorial vote totals).
164.
See Sharon E. Rush, Federalism, Diversity, Equality, and Article III
Judges: Geography, Identity, and Bias, 79 MO. L. REV. 119, 130 (2014) (“The
Framers solidified this important relationship between the Article III judiciary and the
states by providing in the Constitution that the Senate must approve the President’s
judicial nominees.”).
165.
See Opinion, For David Souter, With Hope, N.Y. TIMES
(Sept. 27, 1990), http://www.nytimes.com/1990/09/27/opinion/for-david-souter-withhope.html?login=email [https://perma.cc/6ZHA-2UXU] (describing Souter as
“[v]irtually unknown even to scholars”); see Timothy R. Williams, Bush Names
Counsel as Choice for Supreme Court, N.Y. TIMES (Oct. 3, 2005),
http://www.nytimes.com/2005/10/03/politics/politicsspecial1/bush-names-counsel-aschoice-for-supreme-court.html [https://perma.cc/FQY6-8JB8] (“Ms. Miers . . . has
never been a judge, and therefore lacks a long history of judicial rulings that could
reveal ideological tendencies. Her positions on such ideologically charged issues as
abortion and affirmative action are unclear.”).
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to the selection of a nominee, often to brainstorm the names of potential
nominees.166 President Trump’s list of twenty-one potential Supreme
Court nominees was compiled with the assistance of several of these
organizations,167 but this consultation often transpires prior to a
nomination. When the White House releases the name of a judicial
nominee, its supporters are already armed and ready for political battle,
while its opponents have not even started to contemplate who to oppose
or how to oppose them.
If scarcity is a political reality related to judicial nominations,
particularly for those in opposition, it is far from inevitable. There are,
after all, only nine Justices on the Supreme Court and 874 Article III
judges. President Obama inherited only fifty-nine openings on the
federal bench when he became president in January of 2009.168
President Obama only nominated ten judges or justices during the first
six months of his Administration.169 The evidence suggests that the
Obama Administration nominated fewer numbers of judges during their
first six months as a willful attempt to signal respect to Republican
Senators by making it easier for them to evaluate these judges.170 Fire
alarms are only needed to respond to judicial nominations when there
are so many fires that police patrols are impossible171—and there need
not be many judicial nominations fires.
Therefore, one means of making salient the resource scarcity of
opposition to judicial nominees is to nominate a large number of
candidates simultaneously because political capital rarely can be
increased proportionally in response. Senate and interest group staffing
cannot be increased substantially and immediately, since both tend to
utilize fiscal year funding that could not be changed until the next fiscal
year. This leaves finite number of staff members researching large
numbers of nominees. Stakeholders within and outside of the Senate
must be redeployed to focus on opposing the nomination. Meanwhile,
those supportive of the nomination from within the administration, the
166.
See, e.g., Scherer, Bartels & Steigerwalt, supra note 78, at 1028 n.5;
Scherer & Miller, supra note 50, at 367.
167.
See Liptak, supra note 107.
168.
Rucker & Barnes, supra note 2.
169.
Jeffery L. Viken, Roberto A. Lange, Irene C. Berger, Charlene
Honeywell, Gerald E. Lynch, Andre M. Davis, David Hamilton, Beverly B. Martin,
Joseph A. Greenaway, Jr., and Sonia Sotomayor.
170.
See Lewis, supra note 19 (“By naming judges one at a time, Mr. Obama
is taking a markedly different approach from former President George W. Bush, who
held a ceremony on May 9, 2001, in the Rose Garden to present his first 11 choices for
appeals court seats. The ceremony provided a political air to the nominations, most of
which went to prominent conservatives.”).
171.
See McCubbins & Schwartz, supra note 159, at 166 (defining police
patrols as comparatively “centralized, active and direct”).
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Senate, the interest group community, and the home state of the
nominee have been mobilized and are prepared with their justifications
for the nominee.
Depleted political resources can be replenished over time.
Opposition research that could not be done on a nominee one week can
be done the next week. Interest groups that cannot be convened one
week can be convened the next week. The simultaneous strategy,
though, prevents that from transpiring.
Multiple simultaneous nominations also place pressure on the
opposing party in the Senate to confirm some of these nominees.172 The
more nominees being held up in the Senate at any given time, the easier
it is for the president and the media to target the opposing party for
playing politics with judicial nominations.173 This leaves the opposition
party with an undesirable choice. The opposing party in the Senate can
spend few resources to target each nominee, or a lot of resources to
target a few nominees. If it pursues the first course of action, it will
struggle to defeat any nominee because not enough opposition will
notice the nomination and mobilize against it. If it pursues the second
course of action, it will mean that the rest of the nominees—who could
also be provocative—will more easily be confirmed as a result of the
absence of opposition.
President George W. Bush utilized the simultaneous nominations
strategy many times. He nominated eleven judges to the courts of
appeals on one day in September of 2001.174 Included within that list
were several notable conservative judges.175 He nominated five to the
appellate courts on the same day in January of 2003 and two more

172.
See Micah Schwartzman, Not Getting Any Younger: President Obama’s
Penchant for Older Judges Scuttled Goodwin Liu, SLATE (May 26, 2011, 6:04 PM),
http://www.slate.com/articles/news_and_politics/jurisprudence/2011/05/not_getting_an
y_younger.html [https://perma.cc/458D-AVLX] (“For example, had they been isolated
cases, it is doubtful that Janice Rogers Brown, William Pryor, or Priscilla Owen would
have been confirmed. But there was safety in numbers. With a large group of
controversial nominees, some of them were bound to make it.”).
173.
Press Release, Senator Patrick Leahy, Senate Makes Progress to Fill
Judicial Vacancies (May 8, 2014), https://www.leahy.senate.gov/press/senate-makesprogress-to-fill-judicial-vacancies [https://perma.cc/3UJP-4SVZ] (“Today, there are 74
judicial vacancies throughout the country. At the same point under President Bush in
May 2006, there were 50 judicial vacancies.”).
174.
See Neil A. Lewis, Bush to Nominate 11 to Judgeships Today, N.Y.
TIMES (May 9, 2001), http://www.nytimes.com/2001/05/09/us/bush-to-nominate-11-tojudgeships-today.html [https://perma.cc/3UJP-4SVZ].
175.
See id. (“The first nominees, 11 candidates for the federal appeals courts,
include several outspoken conservatives who are committed to profound change on
issues like the separation of church and state and increasing states’ rights.”).
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within the next month.176 In February of 2005, he nominated six to
appellate courts.177
Senate Democrats were left with limited resources to respond.
When John Roberts was nominated to the United States Court of
Appeals for the District of Columbia Circuit in 2003 as part of the
simultaneous nominations of that year, it was known at the time that
was a potential future Supreme Court nominee.178 Because of the
volume of nominees, though, Senate Republicans successfully moved to
have Roberts testify the same day before the Senate Judiciary
Committee as several other nominees.179 Other prominent Bush
nominees—such as Neil Gorsuch, President Trump’s Supreme Court
nominee—did not receive much attention by overwhelmed Senate
Democrats and were therefore unanimously confirmed.180
By contrast, the Obama Administration largely avoided
simultaneous nominations.181 There was only one day during his first
term when he nominated more than two judges to a federal court of
appeals.182 The moments when the Obama Administration did attempt
this strategy illustrated the merits of the strategy. On June 4, 2013,
President Obama stood “[i]n a formal Rose Garden ceremony normally

176.
See Neil A. Lewis, Bush Selects Two for Bench, Adding Fuel to Senate
Fire, N.Y. TIMES (July 26, 2003), http://www.nytimes.com/2003/07/26/us/bushselects-two-for-bench-adding-fuel-to-senate-fire.html
[https://perma.cc/2SY4-S2BK]
(“President Bush escalated his fight with Senate Democrats over judicial nominations
today by naming two [more] candidates for judgeships for the federal appeals court in
Washington, widely regarded as second in importance only to the Supreme Court.”);
Opinion, Steamrolling Judicial Nominees, N.Y. TIMES (Feb. 6, 2003),
http://www.nytimes.com/2003/02/06/opinion/steamrolling-judicial-nominees.html
[https://perma.cc/SF9X-ZM8H] (“The new Senate Republican majority is ushering in
an era of conveyor-belt confirmations of Bush administration judicial nominations.”).
177.
Bush Administration Nominations by Date, WHITE HOUSE,
https://georgewbush-whitehouse.archives.gov/news/nominations/
[https://perma.cc/W3ZB-F47F] (last visited Mar. 13, 2017).
178.
See Lewis, supra note 174.
179.
See Opinion, supra note 176 (“Republicans on the Judiciary Committee
held a single hearing last week for three controversial appeals court nominees.”).
180.
See Carl Hulse, In Neil Gorsuch’s Confirmations, Parsing the Meaning of
“Yes,”
N.Y.
TIMES
(Feb.
11,
2017),
https://www.nytimes.com/2017/02/11/us/politics/neil-gorsuch-supreme-courtconfirmation.html [https://perma.cc/GX8H-ZC4W] (“Republicans on the Judiciary
Committee held a single hearing last week for three controversial appeals court
nominees.”).
181.
See, e.g., Lewis, supra note 19 (“By naming judges one at a time, Mr.
Obama is taking a markedly different approach from former President George W.
Bush, who held a ceremony on May 9, 2001, in the Rose Garden to present his first 11
choices for appeals court seats. The ceremony provided a political air to the
nominations, most of which went to prominent conservatives.”).
182.
Shear & Peters, supra note 144.
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reserved for Supreme Court hopefuls and prominent cabinet
nominees.”183 He nominated three candidates for the D.C. Circuit, at
least one of whom (Cornellia T.L. Pillard) was more controversial.184
This was immediately perceived by Senate Republicans as a noncooperative act.185 All three were confirmed,186 with Pillard absorbing
the brunt of the attacks by Republican senators and with only limited
resources remaining to evaluate and attack the other two D.C. Circuit
nominees.187
The cooperative behavior of nominating fewer numbers of judges
did not generate a differential and more cooperative response by Senate
Republicans. Hamilton was the only Obama nominee to the court of
appeals for a few weeks and attracted lots of attention and opposition
from Republican senators.188 When more judges are nominated
simultaneously, the same motivation to oppose these nominees is
present—but the ability to do so is less pronounced because of resource
scarcity. If anything, then, simultaneous nomination of large numbers
of nominees reduces political opposition. The motivation to oppose is
constant, but the opportunity to do so is limited.
Simultaneous nominees can increase the political capital available
to the president and his or her nominees. For political supporters,
simultaneous nominations of large numbers of nominees is a signal that
the president is serious about the cause of judicial nominations and
serious about pursuing that cause. The president is signaling that his or
183.
Id.
184.
See id. (“Ms. Pillard’s background may prove a bit more problematic.
She served in the Clinton administration and has worked at the American Civil
Liberties Union and the NAACP Legal Defense and Educational Fund, two well-known
liberal organizations.”).
185.
See id. (“There’s a culture of intimidation throughout the executive
branch,” Mr. McConnell said after the president’s announcement. “There’s also a
culture of intimidation here in the Senate.”).
186.
Cornelia T.L. Pillard, U.S. CT. APPEALS D.C. CIRCUIT,
https://www.cadc.uscourts.gov/internet/home.nsf/Content/VL+-+Judges+-+NP
[https://perma.cc/XNC3-K2G5] (last visited Mar. 13, 2017); Robert L. Wilkins,
U.S.
CT.
APPEALS
D.C.
CIRCUIT,
https://www.cadc.uscourts.gov/internet/home.nsf/Content/VL+-+Judges+-+RLW
[https://perma.cc/6VVX-F699] (last visited Mar. 13, 2017); Patricia A. Millett,
U.S.
CT.
APPEALS
D.C.
CIRCUIT,
https://www.cadc.uscourts.gov/internet/home.nsf/Content/VL+-+Judges+-+PAM
[https://perma.cc/F9BB-6XLC] (last visited Mar. 13, 2017).
187.
Michael D. Shear & Jeremy W. Peters, Judicial Picks Set the
Stage for a Battle in the Senate, N.Y. TIMES (June 4, 2013)
http://www.nytimes.com/2013/06/05/us/politics/obama-to-name-3-to-top-appeals-courtin-challenge-to-republicans.html?hp [https://perma.cc/PN3A-2W7K].
188.
Jeremy W Peters, Republicans Again Reject Obama Pick for Judiciary,
N.Y. TIMES (Nov. 12, 2013), http://www.nytimes.com/2013/11/13/us/politics/senateblocks-judicial-nominee-with-filibuster.html [https://perma.cc/9BM9-RAC3].
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her administration has been expending substantial political resources to
locate large numbers of nominees, and is willing to expend these
resources to ensure these nominees are confirmed. This cost endured by
the administration makes simultaneous nominations a credible signal of
seriousness on the issue.189 Interest groups are therefore more likely to
expend their limited resources pushing for these nominees. Meanwhile,
supporters of the president hear from and are informed by him or her
that this is an important issue, which stimulates supporter interest and
activity.
CONCLUSION
Since Ronald Reagan became President of the United States in
1981, the Democratic Party has been playing defense on judicial
nominations. The Republican Party made finding their most talented
legal minds and putting them on the federal bench a major priority.
Many of the great theorists of the jurisprudential right—Michael
McConnell, Richard Posner, Antonin Scalia—went from the academy
to the bench.190 Many of the great lawyers of the jurisprudential right—
John Roberts, Jeffrey Sutton—went from practice to the bench.191 These
superstars before the bench became superstars on the bench, writing
opinions that are widely known,192 and sending their law clerks on to

189.
See Michael Spence, Job Market Signaling, 87 Q.J. ECON. 355, 358–61
(1973) (noting famously the power of costly signals).
190.
Michael
W.
McConnell,
STANFORD
LAW
SCH.,
https://law.stanford.edu/directory/michael-w-mcconnell/#slsnav-key-works
[https://perma.cc/YJ7W-5MRM] (last visited Mar. 13, 2017); Richard A. Posner,
U.
CHI.
LAW
SCH.,
http://www.law.uchicago.edu/faculty/posner-r
[https://perma.cc/N4LZ-XFEM] (last visited Mar. 13, 2017); Antonin Scalia, OYEZ,
https://www.oyez.org/justices/antonin_scalia [https://perma.cc/2X2B-5ZMZ] (last
visited Mar. 13, 2017).
191.
John
G.
Roberts,
Jr.,
OYEZ,
https://www.oyez.org/justices/john_g_roberts_jr [https://perma.cc/7EHT-WHEG] (last
visited Mar. 13, 2017); Hon. Jeffrey S. Sutton, FEDERALIST SOC’Y, http://www.fedsoc.org/experts/detail/jeffrey-s-sutton [https://perma.cc/67T7-J927] (last visited Mar.
13, 2017).
192.
Think of, for instance, how important it was that Judge Sutton voted to
uphold the constitutionality of the Affordable Care and Patient Protection Act in 2011.
See Thomas More Law Ctr. v. Obama, 651 F.3d 529, 549, 565–66 (6th Cir. 2011)
(Sutton, J., concurring); Andrew Cohen, Judge Sutton’s Opinion Deserves
a
Closer
Look,
ATLANTIC
(June
29,
2011),
https://www.theatlantic.com/national/archive/2011/06/aca-judge-suttons-opiniondeserves-a-closer-look/241258/ [https://perma.cc/5QDL-GSM3] (“The Bush appointee
and former clerk to Justice Scalia [Sutton] surprisingly rules in favor of the health care
law . . . .”).
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become the next generation of elite lawyers and law professors.193
Presidents Clinton and Obama, both former law professors, did not put
together the nominations record to match what happened when a
Republican was in the White House.
Lawyers on the left watched with disappointment, but also with
awe and admiration. Conservatives had admired the liberal legal
movement’s success in the Warren Court years inside and outside of
court, and aspired to create the organizational structure to emulate it.
Now, a generation later, liberals feel the same.194 They wanted their
own president to transform the federal courts in their favored direction.
Just as the Federalist Society looked to liberals a generation ago for a
roadmap to success, Democrats have started to believe that identifying
the triumphs of conservatives on judicial nominations is a good place to
start.
The argument of this Essay has been that the institutional practices
of judicial nominations have generated a discrete list of political
strategies that work better for presidents trying to maximize their
nominations successes. These strategies feature certain common
dimensions that mean that just as they worked for past Republican
presidents, they could have worked for President Obama and can work
for future Democratic presidents. The road to future nominations
success for Democrats involves staying in the same lines that
Republican presidents have created.
Staying in those lines, though, involves a political ethos that has
largely been lacking in the Democratic Party for at least a generation: a
willingness aggressively to prioritize and push judicial nominations.
President Obama’s limitations on judicial nominations were not the
result of losing a brutal political fight, but of largely not starting one at
all. The past several years have witnessed a resurgence of energy in the
Democratic Party, and a desire to revisit political tactics. Regardless of
the ideological preferences of voters or officials, there has been a
gradual trend towards pursuing these preferences with a renewed
intensity. Past institutional norms that Democratic Party leaders refused
to flout have now been reframed as norms that can be leveraged
tactically to achieve maximum outputs. With this motivation to engage
in more aggressive political tactics, the next Democratic president could
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have the opportunity to do what the past few Democratic presidents
have not: use available and aggressive political strategies to create a
federal bench that they find desirable.

